The following article was published in Observer Research Foundation’s Global Policy Series on April 15, 2024. The full text in the global policy series can be read here.
The US is India’s most important partner in global affairs today. Whether in terms of trade, technology, security, education, energy, business, or culture, there is no bilateral relationship that offers a similar level of breadth or depth of convergence as India rises in the international order. For the US, India is arguably its most important partner that is neither a neighbour nor a treaty ally. This fact is reflected in the attention dedicated to improving the relationship with India under presidents as unlike one another as Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. Today, the bilateral and multilateral diplomatic agenda reflects the wide sweep and increasing depth of cooperation between the two countries, including the Quad, the “2+2” Dialogue, the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies, and a host of other bilateral and multilateral working groups on such matters as trade, defence, energy, and education.
Two issues—diaspora and democracy—play important but complex roles in bilateral diplomatic relations. On the one hand, both are used rhetorically to highlight commonalities and convergences between India and the US. Biden, for example, has waxed eloquent about the two countries being “two great democracies,” while Trump has described the Indian-American community in positive terms as “thriving, prospering, flourishing, and hardworking.” On the other hand, both the diaspora and democracy have led to real or perceived challenges in the relationship. For some in the US, India is perceived as having witnessed “democratic backsliding” in recent years, with some commentators going so far as to allege that India is no longer a democracy (an allegation that most Indians might find laughable). Meanwhile, as it has grown, the large and successful Indian diaspora in the US is not always uniformly aligned with many in India on important political, social, or geopolitical matters. The reasons range from the desire for assimilation, polarisation within the diaspora, generational differences, and the transposition of a uniquely American political context onto India’s political landscape.
As a result, despite the superficial convergence on matters concerning the diaspora and democracy, the US and India will have to assiduously work towards better understanding each other if these factors are to support—rather than detract from—diplomatic cooperation. Improving the study of US and Indian history, politics, economics, and culture in each other’s countries could help make a meaningful difference. Additional steps to leverage convergences when it comes to democracy and the diaspora might include greater party-to-party engagement and programmes for second- and third-generation Indian Americans to visit, study, and work in India.
The Diaspora: Overcoming Generational Divides and Polarisation
The Indian diaspora in the US is, by any measure, an extraordinary success. Indians-Americans are among the wealthiest, best educated, and most law-abiding ethnic groups in the US. Indian Americans have made visible strides in politics and policy (such as Vice President Kamala Harris, former Governor Nikki Haley, and World Bank President Ajay Banga), in business (including Microsoft CEO Satya Nadella, Google CEO Sundar Pichai, and former PepsiCo CEO Indra Nooyi), and in entertainment, the sciences, and the arts.
Indian Americans comprise three legal categories. One, there are People of Indian Origin, who are either Indian-born naturalised US citizens or are natural-born Americans descended from people of Indian ethnicity. Two, there are Non-Resident Indians (NRIs), who are Indian citizens residing permanently or temporarily in the US. Other than permanent residents (who hold ‘green cards’), two categories of NRIs stand out in particular: non-permanent high-skilled employees who often work under H-1B, H-4, L-1 or similar visa categories and students at higher education institutes, often under F-1, J-1, or M-1 visa regimes. Indians account for almost three-quarters of H-1B visa petitions and, in 2019, there were over 200,000 Indian students in the US, the second largest cohort after students from China. Three, there has been an increase in recent year in undocumented migrants from India to the US. Some reports suggest that Indians are now the third-largest number of undocumented migrants and, in 2023 alone, there were almost 97,000 migrant “encounters” with Indians at a US border.
Indian Americans who are US citizens are now increasingly important for their voting power—especially in New Jersey, New York, California, Illinois, and Virginia—but also as political donors. In the early stages of the 2020 presidential cycle, Indian Americans donated more than US$3 million to presidential campaigns, more than Hollywood. US citizens of Indian origin have grown by nearly 150 percent between 2000 and 2018 (making them the second-fastest growing community), although they still constitute only about 1 percent of registered voters. Recent surveys suggest that almost three-quarters of Indian American voters lean Democrat, with less than one-quarter leaning Republican. The attraction of the Republican Party for economic reasons is often offset by the perception of Republicans as hostile to minorities and heavily influenced by Christian evangelism.
Several trends are worth noting about the Indian American community and relations with India. First, while Indian Americans are broadly supportive of better India-US relations, good relations with India are not always a high priority when Indian Americans vote. According to one 2020 survey, only 11 percent of Indian-Americans ranked relations with India as a ‘top three’ issue. Second, there are generational differences: more US-born Indian Americans tend to identify as liberal or extremely liberal, whereas first generation Indian Americans tend to identify as moderate. Liberal Indian Americans, in turn, have greater scepticism of India under Narendra Modi’s government, suggesting generational divides in political attitudes towards India. Three, the Indian American community in the US is fractured along cultural, geographic, and professional lines. Indian Americans are also spread across all 50 US states, despite some notable concentrations. They also tend to be disproportionately from western (Gujarat and Maharashtra) and southern India, other than a notable number of Punjabi speakers.
As a result, Indian Americans are by no means a monolithic bloc, and their cultural, geographic, and professional divisions make engagement by India more difficult. Such pluralism will naturally be reflected in their politics. Many Indian Americans will continue to desire closer relations with India, whereas others might express scepticism about Indian politics or policy. This is already evident in positions articulated by Indian American members of the US House of Representatives, who are often responding to their own electorates and ideological imperatives. That some of these statements or actions might be performative or even counterproductive in terms of relations with India are often secondary considerations.
Overall, efforts can be made to deepen engagement between India and Indian Americans despite certain differences, so that the diaspora remains an asset rather than a liability in bilateral India-US relations. Policies that incentivise investment in India, cultural links, and ease of travel have contributed to maintaining ties. These include, for example, the Overseas Citizenship of India status that enables holders who are foreign citizens to live, work, and do business in India, the Pravasiya Bharatiya Divas as a day of celebration for overseas Indians, investors’ networks, and the establishment of more Indian consulates in the US, such as in Atlanta and Seattle.
But the diaspora will be more challenging with current and future generations of US-born Indian Americans. Establishing larger-scale programmes along the lines of the private ‘Indicorps’ or a large state-sanctioned programme along the lines of Taglit-Birthright Israel would create incentives and opportunities for younger Indian Americans to travel, study, and work in India. That, in turn, would help maintain ties to the diaspora over future generations. Furthermore, while the number of Indians traveling, studying, and working in the US is large, the reverse is not true. Over time, beyond just Indian Americans, India will have to find ways to make itself a more attractive destination for American students, workers, and tourists.
Democracy: Beyond Superficialities
India and the US both tend to project themselves as exceptional democracies. For the US, this is a byproduct of its own history as an early democratic republic, its immigration policies that produced a multicultural society, and its post-Second World War leadership in international affairs. These factors resulted in active attempts to promote democracy overseas, often against challenges posed by alternative systems during and after the Second World War, including Nazism in Germany, Japanese imperialism, Soviet communism, and transnational militant Islamism. India too saw itself as exceptional after independence, as a constitutional democracy that was among the first (and certainly the largest) in the post-colonial world. The reality, of course, was that for a half century after India’s independence, a shared democratic identity did not result in much meaningful cooperation between New Delhi and Washington.
Since at least 1999, democracy has proved more of an adhesive for US-India relations than it did previously. The US could make the argument to give India an exception to global nuclear commerce under domestic and international law in part because of India’s democratic credentials. It has also helped facilitate dialogue and cooperation on defence, trade, and people-to-people relations. Democratic convergence has been useful in drawing a contrast with China, a country with which the US and India are in competition. Democratic principles have helped in the establishment and consolidation of the Quad, as well as in multilateral cooperation.
Nonetheless, the superficial understanding of democracy in both countries often masks important differences. There are fundamental differences, for example, in Indian and American approaches to freedom of speech and expression. India’s constitution negotiates not just individual but also group rights, in contrast to that of the US. Indian notions of secularism are not akin to the American value of ‘separation of church and state,’ but instead somewhat closer to what Americans define as multiculturalism. As a parliamentary democracy, India is more like the UK in blending the executive and legislative functions of government, in contrast to the separation of powers in an American presidential system. Even notions of federalism are different: while the US Constitution grants much more independence to states, in India, many fiscal and policy issues grant precedence to the central government. India’s national security and law grants authorities certain powers that are not necessarily analogous to counterparts in the US. Consequently, the context and nature of the debate on freedom of expression, pluralism, secularism, national security, and states’ rights are fundamentally different in the two countries, differences that are not always well understood by US commentators and policymakers. Indeed, in some of these respects India is more representative of democracies in the developing and post-colonial world than the US.
Meanwhile, many Indians might see the American approach as hypocritical. They might argue that the Indian electoral system has greater credibility, with the conduct of elections, number of parties, and high turnout contrasting with disputed recounts, a two-party system, and controversies about voter eligibility in the US. They could also point to greater political polarisation in the US or minority rights being undermined by law enforcement and disenfranchisement. And they observe cozy US relations with authoritarian or undemocratic regimes—not least, Pakistan—as indicative of double standards. At a time when younger voters in the US and the West are more disillusioned with democracy, the appetite for democratic participation in India has increased. At the same time, Indians will need a better appreciation of the cultural and political motives behind consistent US efforts to project itself as a democratic leader, grounded as they are in American history, culture, and self-perception.
The reality, of course, is that despite some crucial differences, democracy in India and the United States suffer from some common challenges, including rampant misinformation, growing polarisation, political concerns about inequality, and risks of foreign interference. Indeed, these challenges ought to lead to greater cooperation and dialogue between New Delhi and Washington about strengthening democracy around the world. Such democratic cooperation would benefit not just from greater awareness and education in both countries about each other’s political impulses and systems, but also greater party-to-party dialogue so that political leaders can develop a better understanding of each other’s systems and philosophies.
Cooperation Despite Diversity
At a basic level, India’s large diaspora in the US and a shared sense of democracy continue to contribute to deepening India-US relations. But they also mask some important and growing frictions. The only solution will involve increasing Americans’ (including Indian Americans’) understanding of Indian politics, culture, and society, while the same needs to be done on the Indian side. Creating or supporting programmes that facilitate two-way work, study, and travel opportunities, and increasing dialogue between important stakeholders, such as youth and political party representatives, will be tremendously useful as the India-US relationship deepens along multiple dimensions over the foreseeable future. While diplomatic efforts are naturally focused on defence and strategic relations as well as trade, investment, and business relations, questions of diaspora and democracy ought to provide more ballast to this increasingly important relationship.
Dhruva Jaishankar is Executive Director of ORF America.