From October 28-29, ORF America hosted a private workshop on maritime burden sharing in the Indo-Pacific region. The event featured discussions on U.S. military capabilities and posture in the Indo-Pacific, China’s intentions and maritime power, and their implications for U.S. allies and partners, such as Japan, Australia, India, South Korea, Southeast Asia, and Europe. The workshop convened 40 participants from over 10 Indo-Pacific countries including the United States, Japan, Australia, India, Singapore, Indonesia, Netherlands, France, the United Kingdom, Vietnam, South Korea, and the Maldives, and European partners such as Belgium and Norway.

Day 1

The workshop began with a net assessment of naval capabilities, posture and operations between the United States, China, India, Japan, and Australia. Within this context, participants considered multiple questions such as: in the last four years, what have been some major changes to U.S. defense posture in the Indo-Pacific region; what are the major challenges facing the U.S. Navy in the Indo-Pacific; what are the major developments in China’s military capabilities, particularly in the maritime domain; and what are analysts often overlooking in Indo-Pacific security?

Speakers:

• Isaac Kardon, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

• Bonny Lin, Director, China Project and Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies

• Ely Ratner, Principal, The Marathon Initiative. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs

• Thomas Shugart, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security; Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.)

• Dhruva Jaishankar, Executive Director, ORF America

Day 2

The workshop continued with a session on unpacking Quad countries’ contributions to maritime security with remarks from Australian, Japanese, and Indian experts. The following session explored future implications of such contributions and how that might change in the context of U.S.-China competition. The workshop concluded with a discussion on Southeast Asia and Europe in the Indo-Pacific region. The participants considered questions such as: what are the Quad countries’ respective naval capabilities and posture in the Indo-Pacific region; in the coming years, how do Quad countries and South Korea see scenarios of U.S. maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific and/or against a more assertive Chinese maritime presence; and how do Vietnam, Philippines and France view the current U.S.-China military balance in the Indo-Pacific region?

Speakers:

• Greg Brown, Senior Fellow, Australia Strategic Policy Institute USA (moderator)

• Mathieu Droin, Counselor, Embassy of France

• Rear Admiral Monty Khanna, Adjunct Faculty, Naval War College, Goa; and Member, National Security Advisory Board, Government of India

• Vice Admiral Girish Luthra, Distinguished Fellow, ORF Mumbai; and former Commander-in-Chief of Western Naval Command, Indian Navy

• Tanvi Madan, Senior Fellow, Center for Asia Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution

• Takuya Matsuda, Assistant Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University

• Gregory Poling, Director and Senior Fellow, Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies

• Rena Sasaki, Doctoral Candidate, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies

• David Vallance, Research Associate, The Lowy Institute

• Andrew Yeo, Senior Fellow and the SK-Korea Foundation Chair, Center for Asia Policy Studies, the Brookings Institution

Key takeaways included:

• China’s strategic objectives endure. U.S. defense planners should not lose sight or focus of China’s objectives, which is to displace the United States from the first island chain and aspire for regional domination in the Indo-Pacific region. This will impede freedom of navigation, trade flows, and access to critical resources for the United States. Hence, this was the context behind describing China as the “pacing threat” in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. It also led to distributing and diversifying the presence of U.S. bases and facilities i.e. defense posture away from Northeast Asia to countries like Australia, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and select U.S. territories.

• The scale and reach of China’s military and maritime capabilities is alarming. China wants to build a military that can invade and conquer Taiwan by 2027. To that end, China has made significant advancements in strengthening its counter-intervention capabilities. The Rocket Force, considered a “crown jewel” of the People’s Liberation Army, possesses long-range precision missiles capable of striking targets as far away as the United States and Japan. Its 2025 Victory Day parade also displayed unmanned systems and nuclear delivery systems, indicating China’s increasing confidence about its military strength. Moreover, China has also built a large “blue-water” navy that can constantly undertake rotational deployments anywhere in the Indo-Pacific region including in the Gulf of Aden and Arctic. In addition to Djibouti, China also has logistics facilities in Cambodia and Pakistan that are most likely to be used for military purposes should future contingencies arise. All these developments when combined with civilian shipping, coast guard, and maritime militia vessels give China more maritime access and reach than before.

• Like-minded countries can counter China’s maritime threats by playing to their strengths. Indo-Pacific countries threatened by China’s behavior have advantages unique to them; be it through geography, operations, access, and alliances. Such countries should leverage these to achieve common objectives and promote interoperability. While China may have strong partnerships with Russia, Iran, and North Korea, the United States also has alliances with Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines. The United States is increasing trilateral coordination with most of these countries through information sharing and military exercises.

• Burden sharing is more than just improving defense spending. It also develops foundations for collective and collaborative security. This would require answering questions such as what roles and missions can our partners and allies do; what are the requisite command and control structures needed; who takes the lead in a crisis; and how to coordinate operations. For example, the Quad is contributing to regional security through providing maritime domain awareness and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief to partner countries.