ORF America Executive Director Dhruva Jaishankar was interviewed by Adrija Chatterjee of Moneycontrol on the sidelines of the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi. Edited excerpts of the interview are below.
How do you see India’s role in diplomacy of late?
In the past, India did play a big role in international issues. It was the first large developing country to be decolonised. And, obviously, people know about Non-alignment and India’s role in that. It played a mediator in the 1950s and 1960s between the US, Soviet Union and China during the Korean War and in other places. Over time as more countries became independent and the world became more complicated, India became more inward looking, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. Since the 1990s, since the economic liberalisation, India made a pivot. What India is realising is that Indian interests are increasing globally. For example, what happens in the Ukraine war impacts grain shipments, which affects global food prices and that impacts Indian consumers. So suddenly the idea that India can only care about its internal politics is no longer true. Not just the leadership, the people realise this. Yes, India has begun to pitch itself as a ‘Vishwamitra’ or the friend of the world, but there are two key differences: China and Pakistan. These are countries with which India has major territorial disputes. Barring those two, India has broadly positive relations with almost every other nation in the world – the US and Russia, Europe and Japan, Israel and the UAE and Iran.
You mention the differences with China and Pakistan. But what about friction between India and Maldives?
I would not put the Maldives nearly in the same category as China and Pakistan. That is not to say India does not have differences with certain countries. Canada is another example and there have been significant challenges with Nepal and Sri Lanka in the recent past. There will be some frictions as India’s interests grow. The question is how they can be managed. It is not as if India has an inimical relationship with Maldives. There are some differences with the current government that need to be resolved keeping in mind security priorities. So, I would put the issues with Maldives in a very different category from China or Pakistan, with whom India has more fundamental differences over territory and more adverse relations.
Do you see the recent tensions with Canada ending anytime soon?
The political difference between Canada and India has played up. But it is very different from how the US and India have navigated ties. Again, a lot of it from India’s point of view has to do with Canada’s domestic politics. Again, this too shall pass. People forget that the India-Canada relation is a very productive one. They are a major supplier of agricultural produce and energy products to India and there are a large number of Indian students there. There are a lot of positives to this bilateral relationship, such as technological cooperation. It is unfortunate that all that is being coloured by what India sees as narrow domestic politics in Canada.
US elections are around the corner. What is your view on the possible outcome and its impact on India?
It is dangerous and premature to predict the outcome of US elections. Any US election is won on a thin margin. Any government today, including the Indian government, is looking at the consequences if President Biden and Democrats are re-elected or if former President Trump and Republicans are elected on the other hand. I would say India is in a very interesting position. Broadly relations have been positive under Biden in the last four years as forward progress has been made on defence, trade, technology, and social relations. Many people, I think, still underestimate the lengths to which the Biden administration has gone to build relations with India. That being said, I think India will be less affected than most other major countries in the event former President Trump is re-elected. India is not as vulnerable. It is not as dependent on the US for security guarantees, the way the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations in Europe, or South Korea are, which is something that Trump has threatened to change. He has threatened to put harsh curbs on immigration, which will impact relations with Mexico and other South American countries. He may be quite disruptive with trade, especially for countries with high trade surpluses with the US like China, Vietnam, and Germany. India does have a trade surplus with the US but its economy is not as dependent on that trade with the US. So, India will be impacted to a certain extent, especially on trade and immigration, but overall, we are in a small group of countries like Israel, UAE, and Saudi Arabia who may not be as concerned about the potentially negative consequences of a Trump presidency.
India has reached out to Gulf nations in a big way. How do you see this move?
I think there is a realisation that the Gulf has tremendous potential. In the past, this was mostly because of energy and the Indian diaspora. But as the Gulf has diversified its economy to services, startups and education, the opportunities have grown. If you take the GCC collectively, it is a major trading partner of India. So, recent developments are simply a realisation of that. And, it is two-way. For the Gulf countries, they see a proximate, major economy in India that is growing at a tremendous rate. I think that mutual benefit is being realised and is being seized upon. At the same time, India is balancing its relations with Iran and Israel. India has broadly positive relationships with most players in West Asia at a time when things are very fractured.
Initially, the West criticised India for buying cheap crude from Moscow. Has that point of view changed?
Much of the Global South did not comply with the G7 sanctions on Russia. Initially, there was pressure to make those sanctions as tight as possible to shorten the war in Ukraine. But after a while there was a realisation that this was going to be a long drawn-out war. At that point, I think, expectations changed. There is now a growing appreciation that India by buying crude from Russia has actually lowered global prices and allowed Europe to pivot its energy supply from Russia to West Asia. I think the discussion on India buying Russian crude has shifted. Today, Europeans may not be happy about it, but they are far more understanding about it.
India’s stand on the Israel-Palestine issue has been heavily debated since the war broke out in Gaza. Has there been a pivot?
Many described India’s positions as flip-flopping. By contrast, I think it was quite consistent. India believes October 7th was an act of terrorism by Hamas and therefore Israel is justified in retaliating to eliminate that threat. India has a similar approach to terrorism, and has also called for the release of Israeli hostages. At the same time, Israel’s response needs to keep in mind how to minimise civilian causalities as much as possible and maintain a humanitarian corridor to Gaza. And, India has provided medical and other humanitarian aid to Gaza. Politically, India supports the two-state solution since it feels that it is the only lasting compromise, although the reality of that is very complicated. In some ways, India is more supportive of Israel on the terrorism issue than many other countries and Israelis have been appreciative of that. At the same time, India has not deviated from its support for a two-state solution. And, that has not impacted India’s relationship with West Asia, because for some of those countries, despite the more pronounced criticism against Israel in their media, their governments are worried about Hamas and its actions. Nevertheless, some of the Gulf nations are concerned about popular domestic resentment against Israel, which could prevent them from having a constructive relationship with it in the near future.
The Red Sea crisis is seen as one of the biggest risks to the global economy. How can India navigate this geopolitical challenge?
As of now, this might change in the future, the Red Sea remains the most important pathway for trade between Europe and Asia. There are alternatives such as the Cape of Good Hope, the Arctic route is opening up due to climate change which is being explored by Russia and China among others, and then there is the proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). But these are medium-term possibilities and will take time to develop. So, none will be a full replacement for the Red Sea, and the recent Houthi attacks on shipping are causing trade disruptions for India. The short-term impact of the Red Sea crisis has been a sharp rise in commodity prices. But it is too early to assess the full impact. Over time, India has to develop resilience. Diversifying trade routes and connectivity projects is one way of doing that. So, the IMEC linking the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean would be useful.
Is there a risk of countries abandoning the proposed IMEC?
The Memorandum of Understanding signed on IMEC says that it will have two corridors – I believe they are described as eastern and northern. The eastern corridor is mostly about connecting GCC countries with India and the other one is connecting Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to the Mediterranean. I do not see any reason for the eastern corridor to stop. What will be possibly delayed is the political normalisation between Saudi Arabia and Israel required to connect that eastern corridor of IMEC with the Mediterranean. However, there seem to be indications from Saudi Arabia that it is not off the table completely. Much will depend on how long and severe the war in Gaza is. And, maybe the disruptions in the Red Sea could work as a silver lining for nations to speed up the process as they explore alternative routes.
If you had to pick India’s top three bilateral partners, who would they be and why?
I would put India’s neighbourhood relations in a different category such as Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. These will always be important. But if you look at global partners, the US is number one, since it is the most comprehensive partnership – be it trade, security, people-to-people contact, energy, technology, they are largely on the positive side. It is hard to pick a top 3 because we have significant relations with others, but they lack some dimensions. Russia is important for security and energy but people-to-people relations and non-defence trade are weak. Then Japan is important as a strategic investor, especially in technology and infrastructure, but the security partnership is limited. Australia and UAE are two relationships that have grown and diversified a lot in recent years. Even China despite the differences is a major trade partner. Overall, after the US one could possibly rate Russia, France, Japan, Australia, the UK, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE among India’s major global partners.
Pakistan has finally picked a coalition government. How do you see relations with India after this development?
Because there have been PPP and PMLN-led governments in the recent past in Pakistan, we have at least some ideas of what the contours of foreign relations could be with India with the new government. But frankly, Pakistan is in the midst of an immense domestic upheaval, be it economic or security-related. That has not stopped with this election, and until there is some resolution, there is minimal gain for India to go out and deepen the relationship. India will be open to dialogue but it requires a credible partner on the Pakistani side. For now, I suspect, India will have to adopt a simple wait-and-see approach. Until at some stage the tensions between the various parties, including Imran Khan and the military, are resolved, it makes very little sense for India to go out on a limb.
Dhruva Jaishankar is executive director, ORF America. The views expressed are personal