Background Paper No. 11
BY AVI KIRPEKAR
Avi Kirpekar was a Summer Intern at ORF America in 2022.
In 2020 and 2021, France, the United Kingdom (UK), the European Union (EU), the Netherlands, and Germany all released Indo-Pacific strategies, indicating a greater European interest in the region. Europe’s recent turn to the Indo-Pacific reflects shifting goals and strategic interests, including increasing transatlantic cooperation with the United States (U.S.). A significant change in approach came earlier in 2019 when the EU labeled China a “systemic rival.” This was followed by a slew of new European policies indicating a more competitive relationship with China, including investment-screening mechanisms, foreign subsidies regulations, international procurement instruments, anti-coercion instruments, and new export-control regulations.
The Biden administration’s eagerness to repair transatlantic ties, while retaining a focus on Asia, has created a window of opportunity for close cooperation between the U.S. and Europe in the Indo-Pacific. But to what extent are existing official European Indo-Pacific strategies compatible with the United States’ own Indo-Pacific strategy? A close examination of these documents suggests three primary areas of opportunity for transatlantic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: fair and sustainable trade, climate cooperation, and maritime security.
A Focus on Security: France and the United Kingdom
The Indo-Pacific strategies released by France and the UK are each, for different reasons, distinct from the tone and priorities expressed by the EU and its other member states such as Germany and the Netherlands. In part, this reflects both France and Britain having territories in the Indo-Pacific. The French and British strategies thus have a more pronounced security dimension, including a focus on maintaining the security of their citizens in the region. Both countries also have a greater ability to project military power in the Indo-Pacific than other European nations.
The French Indo-Pacific strategy published in July 2021 by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs reflects the four pillars set out by President Emmanuel Macron in 2018: security and defense, economic, multilateralism, and common goods, which include climate change and biodiversity preservation. The strategy prioritizes security, describing France’s overseas territories being “at the heart of the French strategy.” The first objective of this pillar is, “ensuring and defending the integrity and sovereignty of France, the protection of its citizens, its territories, and its EEZ.”
Despite the intense security focus, the other three pillars of France’s Indo-Pacific strategy are more focused on regional public goods. From investing in infrastructure and connectivity projects to fighting climate change and accelerating the green transition, Paris has set out several objectives that support shared values with partners in the region and promote the rule of law. Indeed, it highlights a “multilateral international order that is based on the rule of law” and “promoting military and security cooperation and international action based on multilateralism.”
The British government’s Indo-Pacific strategy was released in March 2021 as part of the broader Integrated Review, which described a vision for the UK’s role in the world over the next 20 years. A “tilt to the Indo-Pacific” was set out as a main priority for British economic opportunities, security, and values. With a number of territories in the region and partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries, the UK already has a presence that can be used as a springboard to pursue its strategic objectives. Crucially, as the UK is no longer a member of the EU, London’s strategy is focused on state-based approaches to engaging in the Indo-Pacific.
The UK has listed three reasons for deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific: for economic opportunities, for British security, and for British values. Additionally, there are nine action areas highlighted in the policy document: pursuing trade agreements with Indo-Pacific countries; acceding to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership; strengthening supply chain resilience of critical goods and raw materials; supporting the Association for Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) central role in regional stability and prosperity; strengthening defense and security cooperation; building capacity on cybersecurity; tackling climate change; promoting open societies and protecting public goods; and, using official development assistance more strategically. Prioritizing cooperation with like-minded partners and preserving the rule of law seems to be a common objective between France and the UK. There is, however, a difference of emphasis, with France highlighting security and the UK focused on economic strategies.
Multilateralism and Climate: EU, the Netherlands, and Germany
In contrast to France and the UK, the EU – as well as individual member states Germany and the Netherlands – have outlined Indo-Pacific strategies focused on economics, trade, climate change, connectivity, and norms. In September 2021, the European External Action Service published the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy titled, “The EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.” The policy document outlines seven key priority areas: sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, ocean governance, digital governance and partnerships, connectivity, security and defense, and human security. Cooperation with partners in the region is of the utmost importance for EU engagement in the Indo-Pacific. While multilateralism is not a focus area itself, cooperation with multiple countries and other regional multilateral organizations, such as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), is mentioned throughout the strategy.
The first three priority areas for the EU indicate a heavy focus on climate and economic issues. Sustainable and inclusive prosperity involves building resilience in supply chains to drive economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, while both the green transition and ocean governance involve investments of money and resources to mitigate the effects of climate change. Although cooperation with China is conceivable, such as on climate change, there are other areas in which the EU has made it clear that it will push back on Chinese actions, including on issues related to human rights and freedom of navigation.
The EU strategy reflects some of its member states, and both the Dutch and German strategies were conceptualized as building blocks to a broader EU strategy. The Dutch Indo-Pacific Strategy was published in November 2020 titled, “Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for strengthening Dutch and EU cooperation with partners in Asia.” The document outlines six main elements: security and stability, cooperation with like-minded partners, sustainable trade and economies, multilateralism and international legal order, sustainable connectivity, and climate and the Sustainable Development Goals outlined by the United Nations. While not neglecting its own role in the Indo-Pacific, the Dutch strategy certainly advocates for an EU Indo-Pacific Strategy to take precedence over bilateral engagement.
The Netherlands places a significant emphasis on multilateral cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific, as well as international organizations such as ASEAN. Maintaining the international legal order, especially in the maritime domain, is also a priority, including with respect to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) and the South China Sea. Moreover, the Netherlands has committed to working through the EU to diversify supply chains to build resilience in goods coming from suppliers in the Indo-Pacific.
The German Federal Government published its Indo-Pacific Strategy in September 2020. It outlines seven policy fields that are priorities for Berlin: strengthening multilateralism, tackling climate change and protecting the environment, strengthening peace, security, and stability, promoting human rights and the rule of law, strengthening rules-based, fair, and sustainable free trade, rules-based networking and the digital transformation of regions and markets, and bringing people together through culture, education, and science. Many of these priority issues overlap with those of the other European strategies, but especially the EU. Similar to the Netherlands, the first principle of the German strategy is “European Action” which indicates Berlin’s intention to follow the EU’s lead, especially after the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy was released in September 2021.
The German strategy significantly emphasizes multilateralism, committing to strengthen both bilateral and EU engagement with ASEAN and expand cooperation with other regional groups such as the PIF and the Indian Ocean Regional Association. An emphasis on upholding a “rules based” order characterizes many of the initiatives, including those on peace and security, trade, and networking and the digital transformation. Germany also seeks to establish a greater presence in the region, pledging to open a Regional German Information Center in Singapore and more German Chamber of Commerce offices throughout the region. In all, the German Indo-Pacific Strategy is similar to that of its European counterparts, especially the Netherlands in that it is part of an effort at bolstering a common European approach.
Areas of Transatlantic Convergence
An analysis of European Indo-Pacific strategies suggests three areas with the most potential for cooperation between the U.S. and Europe: fair trade, climate, and maritime security. The U.S. has a much larger presence in the Indo-Pacific than Europe, but it is clear through the five Indo-Pacific strategies analyzed above that Europe is looking to take on a larger role in the region. The transatlantic relationship can be leveraged in the Indo-Pacific to achieve common strategic goals and build the foundations for long-term cooperation in the region.
Fair and sustainable trade stands out as one of the main priorities in all the European strategy documents examined above that European countries share with the U.S. strategy. From “promoting existing international standards in economic competition” to “advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific,” there is significant focus on ensuring that countries are not threatened with economic coercion. Moreover, both the U.S. and Europe want to see a swift recovery from the economic impact the COVID-19 pandemic had on the region. This includes diversifying supply chains and building resilience to reduce strategic dependencies that adversely affected initial responses to the pandemic-caused economic crisis. The recently announced Indo-Pacific Economic Framework may enable the U.S. and its allies to create a strong, fair, and resilient system for economic engagement in the region, which can also be used to expose corruption and drive reforms to eliminate the potential for coercive actions. The newly created U.S.-E.U. Trade and Technology Council (TTC) offers a pathway for increased transatlantic cooperation on trade issues around the world. While the UK is no longer part of the EU, London could still work with the TTC to create a framework for fair trade, encouraging rules to abide by for all countries engaging in trade activity in the Indo-Pacific, emphasizing the principle of multilateralism.
One point of divergence between Europe and the U.S. is on free trade agreements (FTAs). The EU and the UK have been pursuing FTAs with a number of Indo-Pacific countries, but the Biden administration tends to view free trade as a “past model of engagement, leaving our workers, businesses, and consumers vulnerable.” While it is important to recognize the difference in emphasis and approach between the U.S., the EU, and the UK, there are broader convergences on the principles of fair trade. Fair trade and free trade are two different policies, and divergences in one need not hinder cooperation in the other. Therefore, it should be possible to establish transatlantic convergence on a rules-based framework for fair trade, economic cooperation, and engagement in the region.
The second area of opportunity for U.S.-European cooperation is on the climate. All the Indo-Pacific strategies examined here have sections on mitigating the effects of climate change and preserving biodiversity. As such, the U.S. and Europe can work together to increase investment in green technologies, encourage a green transition for countries in the Indo-Pacific, and expand R&D efforts for clean energy technology. Additionally, Europe and the U.S. have an interest in countering China’s strategic influence in the Pacific Islands, especially after the national security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands. All their strategy documents mention increasing support for the Pacific Islands as they fight rising sea levels and increased natural disasters in order to counter Chinese influence in the islands. Both Europe and the U.S. mention cooperating with China where possible on climate change. Moreover, both Europe and the U.S. cooperate with ASEAN on climate issues already, and the Quad, which includes the U.S., has a high-level working group on climate change. All of this suggests a large window of opportunity for transatlantic cooperation on climate, energy, and related issues. At the same time, as climate change is an increasingly partisan issue in the U.S., American domestic politics will shape the progress that the transatlantic alliance can make in this arena.
Lastly, maritime security is a common objective for Europe and the U.S., offering an opportunity for further transatlantic cooperation. The territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas and Chinese actions in these bodies of water have resulted in a strong emphasis on UNCLOS and freedom of navigation in these policy documents. France and the UK hold territories in the region and have a deep interest in maintaining the security of their citizens. From “increasing maritime presence through deployments of offshore patrol vessels” to “speaking out more about violations of international law, including UNCLOS,” there is a common interest in promoting maritime security and a “lawfully governed” sea. Indeed, the United States has conducted a number of freedom of navigation operations in the region. These operations are important for securing the sea lines of communication in the Indo-Pacific that see a large portion of the world’s goods pass through every day. While there is significant hesitation on the part of the Europeans to joining these operations, several European strategies mention increasing their naval presences through ship deployments in the Indo-Pacific, which indicates that maritime security represents a clear mutual concern. Indeed, the United Kingdom deployed a carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific in May 2021, which included the new aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth. Moreover, the EU, the Netherlands, and Germany all have voiced support for the China-ASEAN Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. With this increased presence and the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) plan released in May 2022, there is an opportunity for transatlantic engagement on maritime security in the region. This initiative aims to build a clearer picture of real-time maritime activity through information sharing, common data analysis, and tracking of other activity.
The Scope for Transatlanticism in the Indo-Pacific
The U.S. and Europe can take several steps to expedite transatlantic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. First, on trade, the TTC is a recently established institution for both Europe and the U.S. to collaborate on trade-related issues. Focusing on the Indo-Pacific in the TTC and encouraging close cooperation with the UK will help ensure that trade policies in the region are guided by a rules-based framework and informed by national security considerations.
Second, there is a broad opportunity for not only transatlantic but also multilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific on the effects of climate change. The U.S. and Europe both emphasized close cooperation with ASEAN but bringing European partners into the Quad initiatives on climate would go a step further in encouraging transatlantic cooperation in this domain. The Quad partners – Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. – already have begun work on pursuing common goals and strategic interests, which would ostensibly align with those of Europe. Thus, it only makes sense to expand on this existing cooperation by including European countries and the EU in the Quad climate working group meetings and activities. With the technological know-how and infrastructure to implement green policies, such as green shipping, green supply chains, and information exchange, the transatlantic relationship can effectively advance the green agenda in the Indo-Pacific.
Finally, there are several ways the U.S. and Europe can improve cooperation on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. Inviting European countries to participate consistently in military exercises in the region, such as Malabar or La Perouse, would encourage deeper habits of cooperation. France and the UK would be the most likely to take part in additional regional military exercises. Increasing the frequency of European participation in exercises in the region will contribute to a stronger European presence in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the Quad partners unveiled the IPMDA at the leaders’ summit in May 2022. If European countries (along with others) could join this Quad initiative, it will provide a better real-time picture of the maritime situation in the region. This would allow European partners to collaborate through the IPMDA on information sharing, crisis response capabilities, and fishery protection, with a net result of bolstering maritime security ties.
The United States and Europe have strong stakes in the Indo-Pacific both for their national interests and for the wider international implications. Seeking avenues for concrete cooperation in areas such as trade, climate change, and maritime security would help bring Europe’s considerable resources and expertise in these areas to bear in this dynamic and contested region.
Avi Kirpekar is a master’s student at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and was a Summer Intern at ORF America in 2022. The author is grateful to Garima Mohan of the German Marshall Fund for her comments on an earlier draft of this paper. All errors that may remain are those of the author’s alone.