by Dhruva Jaishankar
The following article originally appeared in The Print on June 13, 2023.
As Prime Minister Narendra Modi prepares for what is only the third state visit by an Indian leader to the United States, where do India-US relations stand today? For more than two decades, commentators in both countries have been prone to writing off relations as difficult and underwhelming, characterised more by mistrust than opportunity. Stories about differences – whether on Pakistan or Ukraine, trade or domestic politics – tend to predominate news coverage in both countries. Yet, despite some important divergences, this is a relationship in which leaders as diverse as Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Modi on the Indian side, and Bill Clinton, George W Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden in Washington have deepened their collective investment. Indeed, given the breadth of issues and structures, India-US relations are arguably better than they have ever been, to the point where even trenchant differences are now discussed with considerable candour between officials from both sides.
The singular change over the past decade or so is that the relationship now has both structure and multiple touchpoints. Strategic dialogues involving the United States and India include the Quad (along with Japan and Australia), I2U2 (along with Israel and the United Arab Emirates), the 2+2 Dialogue involving defence and foreign ministers, the Defence Policy Group (DPG), and a National Security Advisor (NSA)-led initiative on critical and emerging technologies (iCET). The two countries also have a Trade Policy Forum, a Commercial Dialogue, an Economic and Financial Partnership, a Strategic Trade Dialogue, and a CEO Forum. The agenda has further widened with cabinet-level discussions that include the Strategic Clean Energy Partnership and Higher Education Dialogue, and India is also involved in three of the four pillars of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). But it is worth taking stock of what all these discussions have accomplished – or are attempting to achieve – as well as areas of continuing divergence.
Grade A: Good relations, getting better
Quad, I2U2, military exchanges, maritime cooperation, bilateral trade, energy flows, Indian students, and the Indian-American community
Perhaps the most dramatic convergence in recent years has been on strategic issues. The idea that India and the United States could work closely with third partners and in third regions had been talked about for years. But it is now a reality. The major vehicle in the Indo-Pacific is the Quad, which is working on discrete outcomes on critical and emerging technologies, maritime domain awareness, infrastructure, health, cybersecurity, space, and clean energy. The Quad countries, including Japan and Australia, also continue to exchange perspectives on strategic developments and work together in various formats for security cooperation. Coordination on China and the Indo-Pacific between the governments is now broad and regular. The more nascent I2U2, involving Israel, the UAE, India, and the US, encompasses specific projects on food security and clean energy.
When it comes to bilateral security, military-to-military engagements — including staff talks, exchanges, and military exercises — have increased the ability of the two militaries to operate together, building habits of cooperation. Enabling agreements to facilitate logistics and secure communications have been signed, along with some other basic protocols. Maritime cooperation has been particularly promising, including a new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IP-MDA) initiative that involves the region-wide sharing of satellite-based radio frequency data to better secure the seas.
Additionally, the volume of bilateral goods and services trade between India and the United States has grown considerably, creating jobs in both countries. Of particular significance, US energy exports to India – including both oil and gas – have risen significantly from being negligible just two decades ago. The United States remains a preferred foreign destination among Indians for higher education, with Indians comprising the second-largest number of foreign students in the United States. The Indian-American community continues to serve as a successful bridge between the two countries, increasing interest in India about the United States and improving US research, cultural, and business contacts with India.
Grade B: Gradually improving ties
West Asia, Africa, the UN and multilateral organisations, defence co-production, clean energy, technology, and business relations
Strategically, India and the United States are improving coordination in a number of geographies and institutions, albeit from a lower base. These include West Asia (the Middle East) and Africa. While voting patterns at the United Nations remain distinct and unaligned, there is now greater dialogue and cooperation on institutional membership and counter-terrorism. Coordination is improving in many multilateral organisations, including new institutions and those where one or the other party is not a member (such as the Paris Club). The credit and aid agencies of the two countries are also converging, exploring specific projects in third countries. In terms of security, US defence sales and supplies to India have grown, and co-production has increased, with most large defence companies now sourcing products or services from Indian suppliers.
Clean energy and associated technologies represent a promising area of collaboration. US companies are investing in India’s ambitious renewable energy sector, although not yet at ideal volumes. There is also considerable interest in India’s green hydrogen mission, with US firms already producing electrolysers in India. Coordination on critical minerals – especially lithium, graphite, and cobalt – is already underway, and the two countries are coordinating in providing climate information services.
Beyond clean energy, the broader technology partnership is also moving in a positive direction. This includes coordination on 5G telecommunications, nascent cooperation in identifying vulnerabilities in semiconductor supply chains, promising advancements in space technologies, developing networks among investors, and cooperation on supply chains, counter-terrorism financing, and tax evasion. Differences over data governance have been largely addressed by the inclusion of the notion of trusted geographies in India’s pending digital legislation and regulations. In many of these areas, the policy regimes are increasingly aligned, with the expectation that practical cooperation will follow. Finally, while business ties remain strong, with a large Indian and American corporate presence in each other’s countries, there are still plenty of unexplored possibilities.
Grade C: Stagnant or underwhelming cooperation
Afghanistan, Myanmar, Iran, defence R&D, biotech, visas, and US students to India
There are several areas where India-US relations remain stuck or misaligned. In the strategic sphere, these include Afghanistan, where India was excluded from the Doha Process despite having converging objectives. India has now opened up direct channels with the Taliban. On Myanmar, both India and the United States have called for a return to democracy but have pursued different means and levels of engagement with the military leadership due to geographic and strategic disparities. Iran also presents some dissonance, partly complicated by US negotiations around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for Iran’s nuclear programme.
One defence and security, joint defence research and development (R&D) has lagged behind other aspects of the relationship. The Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) was the earlier mechanism for enabling this. But it has proved limiting as there were few cutting-edge defence technologies where India and the US had shared needs and complementary capabilities. Instead, new efforts, including those accelerated under iCET, are being explored to improve defence industrial cooperation. One such development is the establishment of a defence innovation bridge called INDUS-X, which will incorporate the private sector and start-ups.
While technological collaboration has generally deepened, certain sectors, such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, have faced difficulties due to questions of intellectual property. Issues such as cost and accessibility mean the healthcare systems of the United States and India are often misaligned. People-to-people links have been inhibited by an archaic US visa regime and processing challenges exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. This has prevented Indian tourists, businesspeople, and students from travelling to the United States in recent years, although the US government is now making a considerable effort to rectify the situation. While Indian student numbers remain strong, and interest is high, there are still too few US students going to India to study. This reflects both on Indian higher education and infrastructure. Consequently, there is insufficient awareness or knowledge of opportunities in India among Americans, particularly those outside of government and certain business sectors.
Grade D: Major differences
Russia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, democracy, and multilateral trade negotiations.
Strategic differences persist between Washington and New Delhi when it comes to Russia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, although these are now openly discussed in bilateral forums. India still sees the need for engagement with Russia in areas such as conventional defence, energy, food security, critical technologies like nuclear energy and space, as well as larger strategic priorities in Eurasia. The United States, on the other hand, has longstanding relations with various stakeholders in Pakistan, despite the ongoing political and economic turmoil there. This occasionally results in US attempts at resurrecting engagement and assistance to Pakistan, although the levels of trust and importance have diminished. Regarding Bangladesh, the United States has underscored a different set of issues compared to India, which instead focuses on consolidating economic, trade, and connectivity links with the incumbent government.
Other differences arise in the context of democracy, where divergent conceptions and priorities are apparent, despite India’s participation in the US-led Global Summit for Democracy and the two countries’ collaboration to strengthen democratic institutions in third countries and regions. These differences are most evident in the regular religious freedom reporting by the executive branch of the US government, but are also raised in the US Congress—mostly on the left but occasionally among the religious right—as well as in the American media. The Indian government, meanwhile, dismisses such statements as unnecessary interference and has occasionally pointed out the imperfections of American democracy. Finally, sharp differences continue to play out in multilateral trade negotiations, which often adopt a more adversarial tone compared to bilateral commercial discussions.
Conclusion
Overall, the cooperative aspects of the India-US relationship now easily outweigh the areas of fundamental difference. US officials have a considerable appreciation for the diverse ways in which the partnership with India benefits the United States, even if that sentiment has not always permeated through the strategic community, media, or general public. Similarly, sharper disagreements with China on security, regional politics, economy, and technology have prompted India to invest more in its relationship with the United States. Indeed, New Delhi has often reached out to the United States during times when global sentiments towards US power or policy were ambivalent, such as after the invasion of Iraq or Donald Trump’s election. That India will continue to approach the world from its independent standpoint is well appreciated; in a world where power is increasingly diffused, few US leaders are under any illusions about achieving wholescale policy convergence with New Delhi. The real question is how much the two countries can maximise the benefits of their numerous overlapping interests, particularly given the uncertainties of election cycles and domestic politics in the years ahead.