By: Vivek Mishra
This article originally appeared in ORF on October 29, 2024.
There is a strong chatter in Washington DC that the US cut India significant slack under the Biden administration by keeping India embraced despite its unwavering ties with Russia throughout the shadow of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. The perspectives in Delhi are tilted in its favour in that the US needs India just as much. The answer lies somewhere in between those two strands. As such, it is important to explore the nuances that make America’s embrace of Delhi compulsively strong.
India, today, practices a unique realism where it does not seek a brutal interest-oriented path to any regional or global objective. Instead, its interests are balanced by values, most conspicuously of a rising power which is not expansionist and seeks dialogues to resolve disputes, as was exemplified in the recent border thaw with China. Furthermore, India’s rise and balanced position stemming from its strategic autonomy reflect a nuanced revisionism in at least two ways: first, it has nudged the global economy in its way. In the latest World Economic Outlook data shared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), India continues to lead large economies in growth. Second, as a large economy seeking a bigger role at the global stage, India’s strategic choices have enforced recalibrations upon the West. This is particularly in contrast to India’s choices in its neighbourhood, where India has shown a considerable degree of adaptation itself. In many ways, India seeks to redefine its own realistic assessment, which reflects its role as a major power driving and capitalising on shifts in the global order. An important driver of that pursuit has been its economic growth, while its military strength has grown simultaneously. India’s engagement with America is at the forefront of this shift.
Arguably, this shift also involves countries striving for greater individualism. India recognises that to achieve greater economic growth, it has to stay away from the idea of a rigid alliance system, which is conventionally security-based. In large parts, India’s strategic autonomy finds its roots in its non-alignment, which prevented it from becoming a proxy state of the Cold War era. The non-aligned movement was very much a strategic choice, as is its evolved form, strategic autonomy.
Today, India is unapologetically focused on economic growth and wants to ensure peace and stability in the region by stepping up and being the first responder in the region through robust HADR undertakings. Most of all, India stands in regional contrast to most other countries in Asia in its position as a solid democratic anchor in the Indo-Pacific. In the security paradigm, this has often meant how India can balance China. Besides, India’s broad spectrum of democracy and a “trusted” global partner status have allowed the sharing of sensitive information and technology, thus permitting America to have a substantively advanced situational awareness in the Indo-Pacific. These may be some compelling reasons why America seems to embrace India’s strategic autonomy despite the absence of a total strategic lockstep.
For Washington, the China question is rapidly shifting. China’s behaviour on the global stage inherently opposes the type of hegemony the US aims to project and its fundamental belief system. While in the Indo-Pacific, the US’ approach hangs in the balance with two ongoing distractions in the form of the Russia-Ukraine war as well as the war in the Middle East, China’s increasing role and influence with opposing actors may undercut Washington’s Indo-Pacific focus. Given China’s recent strides in the Gulf, with its partnerships with Iran and Saudi Arabia, China is actively looking for a larger strategic space in the region. Furthermore, China’s stance on the war ideologically undermines Israel, America’s strongest ally in the Middle East. As Saudi Arabia is negotiating a new relationship with the US, China is keen to make economic inroads in the region. With the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China also aims to drive a complex interdependence with key US allies across the Middle East, Europe, and the Pacific. It is also essential to note that China’s economic ambitions are not the core issue that America faces but the geopolitical and ideological threat it poses.
There is a tacit recognition in Washington of the indispensability of India in countering China geopolitically in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, the US’ larger regional policy in South Asia has sometimes diverged from core Indian interests, as has India’s own interests in the region from those of Washington. This has allowed India and the US to keep a broad bandwidth in their bilateral relationship, which a formal alliance would not have allowed. This seeming distance has been beneficial to both India and the US. For instance, China’s state behaviour on the global stage inherently opposes the US hegemony, necessitating alternative paradigms of both engagement and opposition. India, with its revamped image in the Global South, a leading economy and a key future player in the global order, provides that dual alternative, which is required to both engage China responsibly and stand up to it when necessary. Most importantly, it replaces the unilateral prism of hostility and provides a nuance to statecraft. India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, in his book “The India Way”, aptly summed it up by emphasising that India’s goal is to grow together, not separately.
For the US, one of the most reassuring things for a bet on India is the latter’s focus on a strong Neighbourhood-First Policy. It has allowed India to balance regional peace and security with growth, especially from its standpoint of the largest economy in the region. Further, India’s “No-First Use” policy, its refusal to station troops in Afghanistan despite US pressure under the Trump administration, positions it as a non-threat to its neighbours - a key component of stable growth. Meanwhile, the trade between India and the US has provided layers of trust in the relationship. In 2023, India rose to the US’ top exporter of refined petroleum, while most of this oil was procured by India from Russia, pointing to the fact that there remains a realistic assessment of bilateral ties rather than it being ideologically driven. Any enforcement of “values” to navigate in the new world order, which is deeply fractured in the long run, could mean a collective downfall. Coming from the non-alignment legacy, India recognises the perils of such a mindset first-hand.
India has positioned itself to champion a new global order, which is more pragmatic than rigid and away from conflicts, navigating a deeply polarised world order sped by the ongoing conflicts in two continents. For America, a partner in the Global South with such a balance may be an asset, as is India’s partnership with the US in compounding its rise to become the stakeholder that it desires. Partnership with successive administrations in Washington has proven that consolidating at home by building a more self-sufficient growth and strengthening its strategic partnership with the US may be a diplomatic balance which can be maintained. Compelling pulls on both sides have allowed India and the US to maintain independence in decision-making and yet align on issues of long-term strategic importance.
Vivek Mishra is a Visiting Fellow at ORF America.