By: Marta Bengoa
The United States has reached a "framework" with China following two days of intensive talks in London. These discussions represent more political theater than substantive policy coherence. The hastily announced deal includes a 55% total tariff rate on Chinese goods, China's commitment to supply rare earth minerals, and expanded visa access for Chinese students. But the fundamental question remains unanswered: What exactly is the United States’ long-term strategy for critical mineral independence?
The arithmetic of President Donald Trump's tariff structure reveals the administration's continued preference for complexity over clarity. The 55% figure represents a composite: a 10% baseline "reciprocal" tariff, plus 20% for fentanyl trafficking, plus 25% reflecting pre-existing tariffs. Meanwhile, China would impose a 10% tariff on U.S. imports. This asymmetric arrangement masks the reality that both nations remain trapped in an economically destructive cycle, with U.S. consumers bearing the ultimate cost through higher prices on everything from electronics to automotive components. What makes this framework particularly troubling is its conditional nature — both Trump and China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping must still approve these arrangements, rendering the London talks more akin to preliminary negotiations than binding agreements.
The centerpiece of the London discussions — rare earth minerals — exposes the administration's strategic incoherence most starkly. China controls around 90% of the world's rare earth production and has demonstrated its willingness to weaponize this dominance. In April, Beijing placed export restrictions on seven rare earth elements as part of its response to Trump's tariff escalation. These materials are critical for defense applications, electric vehicle motors, and advanced electronics. Trump's claim that China will now supply these materials sidesteps the fundamental strategic question: should the United States be deepening its dependence on Chinese rare earth exports or building domestic alternatives?
The environmental and economic realities of domestic rare earth production suggest a deliberate avoidance of hard choices. Processing 1 ton of monazite ore generates 2,000 tons of toxic tailings, and rare earth separation requires eight times more energy than lithium processing. Many rare earth elements reside among mineral deposits with radioactive materials that can leach into the water table. These environmental challenges explain why China dominates the market: it is willing to accept environmental degradation that many developed nations find politically unpalatable.
Current U.S. efforts to build domestic rare earth capabilities remain inadequate. Even when fully operational, MP Materials will only be producing 1,000 tons of neodymium-boron-iron magnets by the end of 2025 — less than 1 percent of the 138,000 tons China produces. The U.S. Department of Defense has committed over $439 million toward building domestic supply chains since 2020 to develop a complete mine-to-magnet rare earth supply chain by 2027, but these investments represent pocket change against the scale of required for transformation. New processing plants and smelters take 10–20 years to become operational, and the Mountain Pass Rare Earth Mine still sent 98 percent of its raw materials to China in 2019 due to the lack of U.S. processing capacity.
What emerges from the London talks is not a coherent policy framework but rather a series of tactical compromises that fail to address underlying strategic challenges. The United States appears to be simultaneously pursuing three contradictory goals: reducing dependence on Chinese critical minerals, maintaining access to Chinese rare earth supplies, and building domestic production capabilities without fully committing to the environmental and economic costs.
The visa provisions for Chinese students illustrate the framework's ad hoc nature perfectly. Educational exchanges should be guided by long-term strategic thinking about technological competition and talent development, not used as bargaining chips in trade negotiations. Meanwhile, China's exports to the U.S. suffered a steep decline of 34.5% in May, widening from a 21% drop in April despite previous trade truces. The economic damage accumulates regardless of periodic summit announcements.
The framework's most damaging aspect may be its signal to markets about U.S. policy durability. The conditional nature of the agreement, requiring approval from both leaders, suggests that any progress could be reversed as quickly as it was announced. Companies cannot make long-term investment decisions when trade policies shift based on the outcomes of periodic summit meetings. The 55% tariff structure, regardless of temporary modifications, will continue to impose costs on American importers and, ultimately, consumers.
This approach guarantees continued uncertainty while avoiding the difficult conversations about what building genuine critical mineral independence would actually require. The administration prefers headlines over the hard work of industrial policy — acknowledging environmental costs, committing to decade-long development timelines, and accepting massive capital requirements. Instead, we get frameworks that promise everything while delivering little.
The London framework may provide temporary relief from trade tensions, but it fails to address the fundamental questions about America's economic relationship with China. Until the administration develops a coherent strategy that acknowledges the real costs and timelines associated with building domestic critical mineral capabilities, these cyclical negotiations will continue to produce more political theater than economic substance. The true measure of success will not be the announcements emerging from diplomatic meetings, but whether the United States can develop the industrial capabilities necessary to compete in the global economy without perpetual dependence on Chinese goodwill. Based on current evidence, that day remains frustratingly distant.
Marta Bengoa is a Non-Resident Fellow at ORF America.