The following article originally appeared in the German Marshall Fund of the United States’ report, Germany’s Role in a Changing Global Order, on February 13, 2025.
Germany should continue to pay close attention to the Indo-Pacific as it considers its place in a post-Zeitenwende world shaped by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and US President Donald Trump’s reelection. China’s rise and growing influence defines the Indo-Pacific, which stretches from eastern and southern Africa to the western Pacific. The region remains important as a locus of global commerce and economic growth, and for being home to heightening geopolitical tensions among the world’s largest economies.
Germany was early in identifying the importance of the Indo-Pacific, with Berlin releasing a strategy for the region in September 2020 as part of an effort to lay out an EU-wide approach. The strategy listed seven priorities: multilateralism, climate change, security, trade, human rights, culture, and digital transformation. Germany has already contributed to the region’s maritime security through legal and multilateral efforts, such as issuing statements of concern about Beijing’s activities in the South China Sea and by coordinating diplomatic positions and legal approaches at UN bodies. Berlin has also deployed naval assets in the Indo-Pacific.
To examine the region it is helpful to disaggregate it. A primary component is China, a major German trading partner but also a growing challenge due to its territorial revisionism (and military buildup), non-market economic practices, and institutional revisionism in multilateral bodies. Discussions about China are playing out most immediately on three issues: unification with Taiwan; overcapacity in various industrial sectors including electric vehicles, semiconductors, and solar components; and Chinese intransigence at the UN and other multilateral bodies. But growing China-Russia convergences also make Beijing an important and direct factor in Europe’s security and well-being. In addition, continuing German investment in China is beginning to have negative consequences for Berlin’s political, security, and economic interests.
Other countries in the Indo-Pacific offer opportunities for cooperation with Germany and its approach to China. The United States and other regional allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia, that are integrated into NATO, G7, and other bodies with a heavy transatlantic component, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and with which cooperation with Germany on a variety of issues is forthcoming, form one group of partners. Another group comprises members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, smaller South Asian states, and Pacific island countries, although they do not necessarily share Western concerns about the consequences of China’s rise. Finally, there is India, which is neither fully integrated into Western alliances nor unconcerned about the prospects of Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. Deeper security cooperation between Berlin and New Delhi is possible, as is economic and technological collaboration. Continued German engagement throughout the region, therefore, is to be expected.
How should Germany approach the Indo-Pacific? On the economic front, investment in the region writ large, beyond a highly saturated and centralized Chinese economy, is required if Germany is to increase its own resilience through diversified market access and import sources. Germany can also play a valuable role to bolster security, though political and military considerations rule out force projection. Berlin, however, could mirror the actions of some smaller European countries, such as Czechia and Lithuania, by developing a closer relationship with Taiwan. This would offer intelligence cooperation and increased economic resilience, and it would show Washington that Germany is playing a greater role in a theater that the United States is likely to prioritize in the coming decades.
Berlin could also leverage the scale of Indo-Pacific markets to help rebuild the German defense sector. As the country rearms under its Zeitenwende and seeks to decrease its dependence on the United States for military support and armaments, certain Indo-Pacific countries become more attractive for their markets and as supply chain partners and sources of technology. These include the more obvious candidates—Japan, South Korea, and Australia—and others such as India, the Philippines, and Indonesia.
Understandably, Germany will be preoccupied in the short term with Europe’s eastern and southern flanks, the transatlantic relationship, and the Middle East, but Berlin has important economic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific. A proactive German approach to the area will require clarifying challenges and priorities, investing in a better understanding of regional dynamics, and pursuing a set of creative policies that defends and advances economic and political interests.
Dhruva Jaishankar is Executive Director at ORF America.