The following article originally appeared in the Hindustan Times on February 17, 2025.
Amid the administrative chaos swirling through Washington DC, the visit this week of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his meeting with US President Donald Trump offered some relative predictability. The two engaged in discussions that also involved several US cabinet officials, including the secretaries of state, interior, commerce, and energy. In conclusion, Trump and Modi announced a wide-ranging agenda to take the bilateral relationship forward. It included efforts that built upon the progress made during the Biden administration, particularly in terms of technology, defence, and regional cooperation. But there were also a surprising number of new initiatives floated. At the same time, larger uncertainties over US policies concerning trade and Trump’s larger geopolitical intentions linger. These will have to be navigated over the next several months.
At its most superficial level, the visit went as one would have expected, given Trump and Modi’s past engagements. The leaders hugged, lavished praise on each other, and found a number of points of convergence. More importantly, they agreed to continue — and even build upon — various forms of institutional engagement between their two governments. These included continued cooperation in Quad, I2U2, and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). They also hinted at more minilateral initiatives, which suggests the Trump administration may be less sceptical of multilateral efforts than many of its critics feared. With Quad having already met at the foreign ministerial level and India’s defence minister Rajnath Singh discussing a possible ‘2+2 meeting’ with his counterpart, US secretary of defence, Pete Hegseth, the institutional underpinnings of the relationship look well set.
Bilateral relations were also consolidated, particularly in the areas of technology, defence, and energy. The two countries announced a US-India COMPACT for the 21st century and agreed to renew a 10-year defence framework agreement, building upon those signed in 2005 and 2015. The US and India also announced deals on defence sales and co-production, including Stryker infantry combat vehicles and Javelin missiles. India also agreed to purchase more P-8i maritime reconnaissance aircraft. More ambitiously, the US pledged to review its policies to consider making fifth-generation fighter jets and undersea systems available to India. While this should not be seen as an imminent plan to sell F-35 jets, it does indicate a willingness by Washington to lower export controls and other barriers to defence exports. In the near term, such an offer will increase opportunities for the integration of defence supply chains and the manufacturing of critical components in India for the US defence industry.
Beyond defence, there were important agreements on energy. Although India has been purchasing oil and natural gas from the US since 2017, higher imports will be enabled by fewer US constraints on drilling and pipeline construction. The Trump administration’s keenness to bring down energy costs will benefit India as a major energy importer. The two sides also agreed to coordinate on critical minerals, including through the US-led Mineral Security Partnership and a new Strategic Mineral Recovery Initiative. Taking advantage of India’s proposed changes to civil liability legislation, the two countries have sought to work together on civil nuclear energy, including advanced small modular reactors (SMRs).
Technology was another area featuring exciting new announcements, including under an overarching effort called TRUST. This will see further cooperation on defence, space, semiconductors, Artificial Intelligence infrastructure, and pharmaceutical supply chains. While semiconductor, defence, and space cooperation had already grown under an initiative for Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), begun under the Biden administration, the new joint statement pledges to widen efforts. This could extend to developing data centres and strengthening pharmaceutical supply chains. Other important developments included an Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance as well as efforts to cross-pollinate technology start-ups.
Beyond these areas, there were some important declarations , including continuing efforts to strengthen higher education cooperation, the promise of creative solutions to legal migration that would satisfy both US and Indian concerns, and — to more significant fanfare — the announcement of the extradition of Tahawwur Rana for terrorism. All in all, Trump and Modi presented a rich and substantive agenda that can be built upon over the next four years.
This is not to say that there will not be difficulties in India-US relations. But two major ones — immigration and trade — showed glimpses of potential resolution. While India has agreed to cooperate on undocumented migration and human trafficking networks, it is also exploring ways to increase legal migration, including students, businesspeople, and technology talent.
Trade could potentially be trickier. Trump had earlier unveiled a plan to apply reciprocal tariffs on various countries and singled out India for having particularly high tariffs. The Indian counterpoint involves stressing its own investments in the US, other economic activity that offsets goods trade, recent steps to reduce tariffs on certain goods, and shared concerns about China’s overcapacity. But these conditions also present room for a Bilateral Trade Agreement, mentioned in the joint statement, that could be concluded in about seven or eight months. In principle, such an agreement would be similar to a deal negotiated in 2020 but never concluded. Recognising the potential to settle differences over trade and tariffs, the two sides made the ambitious pledge to double their bilateral trade to $500 billion by 2030.
Of bigger concern is the US’ overall geopolitical orientation. In the run-up to his meeting with Modi, Trump spoke about the possibility of negotiating with China and Russia on nuclear arms control and a potential reduction of defence budgets. He reiterated much the same in Modi’s presence. New Delhi would welcome a reduction of tensions between Washington and Moscow along with a satisfactory resolution to the war in Ukraine. However, should the US seek certain strategic accommodations with China, it would risk inviting aggression in the Indo-Pacific, with consequences for Indian security. For India, this would be a space to watch closely over the coming months and years.
Overall, the first engagement between Indian and American leaders in Trump’s second term met most expectations. The two leaders got along, laid the foundations for institutional engagement, created pathways to resolving differences over trade and immigration, and signed some quick deals on defence, energy, and technology. The US can make the case that Trump is repairing the country’s trade deficit and generating investment and employment at home. India can continue to benefit from commodities and technology to advance its industrial objectives, while strengthening its defence and innovation ecosystems. But the fluidity of geopolitics — in Europe, West Asia, and the Indo-Pacific — will continue to require consultations and tending.
Dhruva Jaishankar is Executive Director at ORF America.