The following article originally appeared in The Hindustan Times on May 15, 2024. The full text can be read here.
New York recently witnessed discussions concerning the Inter-Governmental Negotiations (IGN) on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform. An obscure diplomatic process, the IGN was recently given a new lease of life by the opportunity to inform a landmark Pact for the Future expected later this year. But the push for UNSC reform also reflects growing concerns, hastened by developments in Ukraine and Gaza, about that institution becoming ineffective and unrepresentative. The five permanent members who can veto resolutions (or P-5) — the United States (US), Russia, China, United Kingdom (UK), and France — represent the victors of World War II. Asia, Africa, and Latin America remain severely underrepresented.
In 1950, when Asia claimed one-half of the world’s population, one-fourth of UN members, and one-fifth of the world’s economy it was unfair — although unsurprising — that the continent received just one-fifth of seats on the Security Council. Global circumstances have undoubtedly changed since then and the disparity between reality and representation is even more absurd. Now Asia boasts 60% of the world’s population, almost 40% of the world economy, and more than 25% of UN members, but still has just 20% of Security Council seats.
The movement to reform the UNSC has been building gradually for some time. The expansion of non-permanent membership in the 1960s offers an important precedent. Around the same time, the Economic and Social Council of the UN was increased from 18 to 27 and subsequently 54 members. More recently, the IGN evolved from a more informal open-ended working group (OEWG) on UNSC reform.
In 2015, a framework for negotiations was agreed upon with specific suggestions. But efforts at initiating a text-based negotiation have since stalled. The IGN languished in purgatory, with no clear text, timeframe, or record of proceedings. This year’s Summit for the Future has given the process some momentum but, in truth, the prospects for real change have grown from nil to negligible.
One reason is that negotiations are riven by cliques. The G-4 (comprising India, Germany, Japan, and Brazil) has called for their own inclusion as permanent UNSC members (along with two African representatives) and more elected members. India and other G-4 countries may be willing to accept permanent membership without a veto, subject to a review after 15 years. The L.69 group, of which India is also a participant, has proposed the expansion of permanent and non-permanent membership but with a more maximalist position on the veto for new members.
Although a majority of UN members have expressed support for expanded permanent and non-permanent membership of the UNSC, there is spirited opposition from the United for Consensus group or UfC (also known as the “Coffee Club”). This grouping is led by countries such as Italy, Pakistan, and Argentina who oppose the expansion of permanent membership, often to block regional rivals such as India, Germany, and Brazil. Meanwhile, four of the five permanent UNSC members — the United States, UK, France, and Russia — have agreed in principle to new permanent and non-permanent members. The administration of Joe Biden recently broke from precedent in outlining its commitment to reform. But in practice, the P-5 have often dithered, reluctant to support specific proposals.
A further challenge comes from a lack of consensus among the Africa group over how to determine their nominees for permanent UNSC membership. They fear that any concrete negotiations over details will sow divisions, which is unfortunate, given that Africa has arguably the biggest stake in UNSC reform.
But the biggest obstacle remains China. China alone among the P-5 has not voiced support for the expansion of permanent UNSC seats but often hides behind others in negotiations. It is ironic that the most significant obstacle to better representation for Asia and the Global South should come from the sole Asian permanent member in the UNSC.
Given these constraints, is a compromise possible? One option could involve the expansion of permanent membership to 11 (the P-5, G-4, and two African representatives) along with a proportional increase in non-permanent members. Instead of a strict veto, “no” votes by a certain number of permanent members could block a motion. This would make the UNSC simultaneously more efficient and more representative. Such a formula might also prove more acceptable to the P-5 than either the complete repeal of the veto or its extension to all permanent members.
In the meantime, the continuing absence of action would betray the letter and spirit of the UN Charter and its intent to shield future generations from the prospect of devastating war, ensure respect for treaties and international commitments, and promote social progress and human dignity. It would only further transfer legitimacy to non-UN bodies, whether regional groupings such as the African Union or institutions such as the G20. After all, last year’s G20 summit in New Delhi demonstrated that it was possible to forge a consensus on some pressing global issues. To regain its effectiveness, the UNSC must reflect the world as it is and will be — and not the world as it was almost eight decades ago.
Dhruva Jaishankar is executive director, ORF America. The views expressed are personal