By: Vivek Mishra
This article originally appeared in ORF on October 17, 2024.
The rationale for the US security partnership with India is primarily driven by strategic considerations, rooted in the US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific region. For the United States (US), elevating India as a potential rule-shaper in the region aligns with its interest in promoting shared values and objectives. India is seen as a regional balancer and a counterweight to China's assertiveness. As India expands its regional capabilities, there is growing anticipation that it will assume greater responsibilities as a global power. However, the trajectory of this partnership will be significantly influenced by the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election. Crucially, divergences in the bilateral relationship will continue to shape the partnership, especially as India assumes a more prominent role in the global economy and governance. These differences span a range of geostrategic issues, including India's relationship with Russia, the US approach to China, and India's policies in its neighbourhood, particularly in South Asia.
Approach
The India-US security partnership is driven by internal and external factors. Internally, both nations are aligning public and private channels to foster a stable and expanding defence and security ecosystem. This effort is supported by key defence agreements, including the four foundational pacts, India’s Major Defense Partner status, and the Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership. Externally, India’s role as a democratic regional balancer in the Indo-Pacific aligns with US strategic interests. New Delhi's ongoing territorial conflict with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Himalayas has created additional opportunities for collaboration between India and the US on contingencies in case relations with China deteriorate. However, the future trajectory of US-China relations presents uncertainties for both India and the broader Indo-Pacific, as the region grapples with evolving demands in connectivity, infrastructure, and technology.
Today, India and the US are leveraging these convergences to establish a network of security-focused collaborations, including intelligence sharing, maritime cooperation, defence industrial ties, strategic trade, and technology partnerships. Collaborative minilateral efforts, such as the Quad with Australia and Japan, further strengthen this partnership. For India, the Indian Ocean has become a critical arena where regional stability and security in the Indo-Pacific can be anchored. For the next US administration, which has borne the primary responsibility for maintaining security in the Indian Ocean over the past decade, India’s growing regional role will be vital. The western Indian Ocean could serve as a model for how India and the US can address challenges in security, connectivity, and infrastructure development.
From the perspective of great power competition, the US seeks to enhance India's role as a key regional player in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), particularly in countering the potential extension of Chinese maritime influence beyond the Pacific. While India is actively expanding its security framework across both the eastern and western IOR, the evolution of the India-US security partnership remains uncertain. For instance, how the two nations might cooperate in the event of a Taiwan crisis remains unclear, as does the extent of US efforts to counter Chinese hegemony in the Pacific.
The Quad is likely to remain a key mechanism for pushing a joint vision of security and regulation in the Indo-Pacific. India is part of other key minilateral frameworks including various trilaterals with like-minded partners, which seek to integrate the elements of security cooperation with the prospects for economic interests, regulation and international law. The Quad’s role has been elevated and its purpose expanded through the regular meetings at the level of Foreign Ministers as well as its annual leaders’ summit. India’s own approach has evolved in how it views and assesses its role in the South China Sea region, as was evident through its participation in maritime exercise in 2019 with the US and other navies and its joint exercise with ASEAN countries in May 2023, sending its warships for the first time in the South China Sea.
In the last few years, India has walked the talk in operationalising its security role in the region through tangible actions. India has joined the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and is undertaking joint missions as part of developing interoperability with other navies, in particular the US. India is providing its shipyards for the US Navy to conduct repair-related work and use US ports for dockings. These commitments are indicators of a transformation which showcase operationalisation to move beyond agreements and joint statements.
India’s interests are intrinsic to its outreach and growth as a key player in the Indo-Pacific region. Its interests come as complementary to the US intent to push India’s role as a net security provider in the region. In this regard, India’s asymmetrical capabilities vis-á-vis China remain a major challenge. For India, its partnership with the US may be a key structural mechanism to fill the capacity gap and effectively counter Chinese ambitions, among other pursuits.
Tempering expectations
Every US presidency brings its own approach to key bilateral relations. India now enjoys bipartisan support in the US Congress, which has added a layer of predictability to the relationship. The deepened cooperation between the US and India is largely due to fundamental strategic convergences, creating a natural partnership between the two nations. However, the scope and intensity of bilateral security engagements under the next US President will partly depend on external factors. While ongoing cooperation is certain, the resolve of the next President to maintain or even enhance strategic commitments in the Indo-Pacific may vary, especially as the wars in Europe and the Middle East strain US resources.
Additionally, US commitments in the Indo-Pacific, particularly regarding the China challenge, could differ depending on which of the two prospective candidates wins the presidency. The trajectory of India-US cooperation will be influenced by the priority the new President assigns to US interests in the Pacific, and how Washington balances its focus on China and the Indo-Pacific amid the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the multi-front war in the Middle East. As these conflicts are likely to continue into the next administration, the question remains whether the next US President will re-pivot to prioritise competition with China.
In New Delhi, diplomatic talks with China are showing signs of progress toward resolving the border dispute, though it remains uncertain if these efforts will yield concrete results in the short to medium term. India's China conundrum and its security relationship with the US may seem like separate foreign policy issues, but they are increasingly intertwined. The Galwan clash significantly deepened India's mistrust of China, prompting India to seek new synergies in the Indo-Pacific as part of its evolving regional strategy, with the US playing a key role in that vision.
It is expected that the next US President, regardless of party affiliation, will continue the current Indo-Pacific policy. The approach to China under a Harris or Trump administration, however, could shape the extent of US commitments in the region. Since China is a bipartisan issue in the US, the next administration is likely to maintain the broad policies of its predecessor. A Harris administration may focus on sanctions and targeted restrictions on China, following Biden's lead, while a Trump administration could emphasise raising tariffs on Chinese exports to the US. Either way, Indo-Pacific supply chains will be impacted as China recalibrates and imposes its own retaliatory tariffs. The long-term implications for Indo-Pacific security remain uncertain.
In terms of India-US relations, while the partnership is now structural, both convergences and divergences exist and shape the contours of the relationship. External factors are likely to weigh heavily on US commitments in the Indo-Pacific under the next administration, which will in turn influence the evolution of the India-US security partnership.
Vivek Mishra is a Visiting Fellow at ORF America.