By: Lindsey Ford
The ongoing crisis in the Middle East — which involved Israeli and then U.S. strikes on Iranian targets, including nuclear facilities, as well as Iranian retaliation against Israel and U.S. bases — carries some important lessons for potential crises between India and Pakistan. The Middle East and South Asia are, of course, two very different regions, each with their own unique geopolitical rhythms. Yet there are nonetheless interesting parallels to be drawn.
One, escalation management is becoming more challenging. The quickly-spiraling nature of the latest Middle East crisis should be a reminder that escalation risks can be hard to control. Israel’s bold June 12 strikes on Iran’s military leadership and key infrastructure proved successful, but Iran’s response quickly escalated, hitting residential buildings, energy infrastructure, and one of Israel’s top medical facilities. Even with a missile defense system that is the envy of the world, Israel has been unable to intercept all of Iran’s attacks. Decision-makers in New Delhi have repeatedly pointed to India’s deliberate efforts to manage escalation risks during last month’s crisis, emphasizing both the “proportionate” and “measured” nature of the strikes against Pakistan-based camps. But New Delhi cannot be confident that intentional escalation management will succeed in the future. If anything, the shift toward unmanned systems and stand off weapons enables both sides to expand the geographic scope of their strikes with relative ease, suggesting a more serious risk of future attacks on civilian infrastructure. India is making investments in civil defense, but it will have to be prepared for a new reality that could include previously unthinkable hypotheticals, such as cyberattacks on Bangalore or drone swarms aimed at Mumbai.
Two, tactical gains often generate strategic costs. The latest Israeli and American strikes on Iran have been technically spectacular. But they still may not offer an enduring win. One of the most worrisome questions for both the United States and Israel is whether the long-term costs will be worth the near-term gain. Will Iran rebuild and emerge as an even more intractable threat in the future? What tradeoffs will this situation create for U.S. efforts to prioritize threats in the Indo-Pacific? New Delhi could face similar questions. The Modi administration has set a new zero-tolerance baseline for future terror attacks, arguing that any such incursions will be met with military force. But will that shift Pakistan’s calculus? What are the potential tradeoffs of India’s new deterrence strategy in terms of procurement or budgetary allocations, including its ability to respond to a more serious threat from China’s People’s Liberation Army? Much as the United States is once again being reminded that Middle East deployments force zero-sum tradeoffs in the Indo-Pacific, India too may face unpalatable tensions between urgent requirements and strategic priorities.
Three, no military is completely self-sufficient. Military leaders in New Delhi have long admired Israel’s military, lauding its advanced technologies and operational proficiency. Yet the past week’s events serve as a reminder that the notion of a fully self-sufficient military remains illusory for even the best-equipped defense forces. Israel has advanced strike platforms and sophisticated air defenses, and yet, it remains highly reliant on external partners to fully prosecute a campaign against Iran. In both the current crisis and last year’s Iranian attacks, Israel has leveraged allied combat power to block Iran’s barrage of missile and drone attacks, and now, U.S. air power and munitions to attack Iran’s enrichment capabilities. New Delhi’s calculus is more complex than the one Israel faces. Yes, Indian air defenses appear to have performed well during Operation Sindoor, but a wider military campaign could rapidly stress India’s intelligence capabilities, munitions, and missile defenses. Israel, Ukraine, and even Russia have relied on external support in recent conflicts. How and where will India need to do so in the future? Answering these questions now could help New Delhi have more certainty in planning for future campaigns that will bear little resemblance to the border wars of the 1960s or even the 1999 Kargil War. And engaging close partners in these discussions will ensure they are prepared to provide support if and when needed.
Four, the offense-defense dynamic is changing. For its part, Pakistan should consider how both technology and geopolitics could shift offense-defense dynamics. Most India-Pakistan crises have started in the same way: India is attacked by terrorists, New Delhi responds, while Pakistan seeks Western diplomatic intervention to restrain India’s response. Two developments suggest this dynamic could change in the future. First, Pakistan may no longer be able to rely on an aggressive Western intervention to prevent Indian counter-attacks. U.S. messaging in the immediate aftermath of the April 22 Pahalgam attack did little to waive India off from a muscular response, much as the United States and other European countries highlighted Israel’s right to self-defense following its recent strikes on Iran. Over the years, Western national security establishments have grown weary of the types of proxy strategies both Iran and Pakistan have repeatedly employed. Even more concerning for Islamabad, however, should be the prospect that India, like Israel, might see first mover advantages in the future. The past year has provided multiple case studies that suggest technological innovation is rendering defense far more difficult, and expensive, than carefully planned offensive operations. For New Delhi, the appeal of pre-emption could increase.
Five, strategic programs could accelerate. The loudest message Rawalpindi might take away from the past week is to accelerate your strategic programs while you can. India’s targeting of Nur Khan airbase, Israel’s rapid elimination of Iranian military leaders, and now U.S. attacks on Iran’s supposedly impenetrable facilities, have all highlighted the greater ease with which strategic facilities and personnel can be put at risk. Pakistani leaders have long feared that the United States could eliminate its nuclear program. The Trump administration’s risky strike on three Iranian facilities will only deepen this sense of paranoia. The logical response from Islamabad would be to accelerate development of new deterrent capabilities. This prospect should be a concern for the Trump administration, given Pakistan’s ongoing development of a long-range ballistic missile program U.S. officials have said could eventually “strike targets well beyond South Asia, including the United States.” The Trump administration has not yet publicly commented on Pakistan’s missile program, nor has it taken steps to strengthen existing sanctions put in place by the Biden administration. Islamabad’s leadership would almost certainly prefer to avoid this conversation and focus on issues like counter-terrorism cooperation, airspace access, or cryptocurrencies. But the United States ignores this long-term problem at its own peril.
Lindsey Ford is Senior Fellow for the Foreign Policy & Security program at ORF America.