By: Dhruva Jaishankar and Medha Prasanna
This summary analysis is based on a day-long retreat organized by the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations and the Observer Research Foundation on May 30, 2025 in Manhasset, New York, with nine Permanent Representatives to the United Nations and an additional 11 Permanent Missions.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) — at the center of the United Nations system — faces twin crises. One is a crisis of legitimacy. The UNSC reflects the immediate post-World War II order of 1945. Asia, with 60% of the world’s population, has only one permanent member: China. The third-, fourth-, and fifth-largest economies in the world (Germany, India, and Japan) are not permanently represented. Africa, home to 25% of UN members, has zero permanent UNSC members despite Africa being the subject of about 60% of UNSC resolutions. UN member states are increasingly turning to alternative multilateral and regional bodies, such as the G20, G7, BRICS-plus, the Quad, and African Union, to address multilateral challenges.
The second is a crisis of effectiveness and relevance. In practice, the UNSC had already become more of a humanitarian organization, mitigating but not dampening conflict, with a particular focus on civil wars, non-proliferation, and counterterrorism. The UNSC now meets more frequently than ever but passes fewer resolutions. The body has been found wanting in crises such as Syria, Ukraine, and Gaza, and has fallen short in Sudan, Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Haiti. Moreover, the UNSC is unable to contend with transnational security challenges such as pandemics and climate change, and the breakneck speed of technological advancements. Meanwhile, functions such as peacekeeping and humanitarian delivery are increasingly privatized, as in the Sahel and Gaza.
Any potential reform to the UN Security Council can only come from above (the P5 permanent members themselves), from below (the UN General Assembly), or from outside (e.g. proposals agreed at the G20). There are precedents for such change. The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) expanded in 1965 and 1973. The 1960s also saw an expansion of non-permanent members to the UN Security Council, following the rapid growth of UN membership. The latest bid for reform has been slow-moving, dating back to the 1970s. An Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) gradually evolved into Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN), but the proceedings remained slow and opaque. Minutes of meetings were not kept for many years and text-based negotiations have not materialized. Under recent co-chairs Kuwait and Austria, efforts were made to make the process more transparent and inclusive, although text-based negotiations remain elusive.
The reform process is characterized by several entrenched coalitions. The G4 — a progressive advocacy group seeking real and expedited reform — comprises of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan. This group has offered a model involving their own inclusion as permanent members, along with two African representatives, the expansion of the non-permanent category, and a 15 year review clause. The L.69 group, representing several developing countries in the Global South, has advocated for more radical proposals that might further dilute the power of permanent members. There is room to bridge these two positions, and India — as a member of both groups — can facilitate that process to create a common negotiating position.
Resistance to reform comes from three primary sources. With the exception of France, and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom, the P-5 permanent members — in particular China — have resisted the expansion of permanent members and text-based negotiations. This will necessitate reform from below, through the UN General Assembly. The second source of resistance is the Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group, also known as the ‘Coffee Club.’ This group of 12 countries, including Argentina, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, Spain, and Turkey, is motivated primarily by regional rivalries with aspiring members to block the expansion of the permanent category. Finally, the lack of consensus in the developing world — especially the Africa group — about a formula for determining African representation has delayed the move toward text-based negotiations. A further wildcard is the United States’ receptiveness to UN reform under Donald Trump’s presidency, which could manifest itself in either indifference or greater resistance to change.
Beyond the constitution and membership of a reformed UN Security Council, there are other considerations at play. The most important is the veto, currently enjoyed by the P5. Three of the P-5 (the United States, Russia, and China) have regularly employed the veto in recent years, including in cases such as Sudan that have contributed to institutional paralysis. Article 27.3 of the UN charter states an obligatory abstention by UN Security Council members on disputes to which they are a party, but this has not been enforced in practice. Among others, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Liechtenstein have floated proposals on the dilution of the veto, or steps which might empower the UN General Assembly.
A compromise will be necessary between the proposals being floated by competing blocs. For meaningful progress, a consolidated model for the Global South is needed, one that is acceptable to the vast majority of UN General Assembly members. The current consensus centers around 22-29 total members and an expansion of the permanent category to include the P5, G4, and two African members. Questions remain on full veto rights for new members and conditions for the use of a veto. Proposals might include a qualified majority, stipulations that raise the cost of use, a stricter enforcement of Article 27.3, or a double (or even triple veto) that reflects current geopolitical realities.
Last year’s Pact for the Future offered an imperfect roadmap for a potential reform agenda, one that had buy-in from most members. This year’s UN@80 offers the potential for a springboard toward more lasting reforms by 2030. The path forward will require negotiations between the G4, L.69, UFC, and Africa Group — along with reform-minded P5 members France and the UK — toward a consolidated model, followed by text-based negotiations facilitated by the IGN. This, in turn, can set the stage for urgent Security Council reform through the UN General Assembly.
Dhruva Jaishankar is Executive Director at ORF America and Medha Prasanna is a Program Coordinator and Junior Fellow for the Energy & Climate program at ORF America.