The following piece originally appeared as “The US-Iran Peace Deal: Experts React” on ORF Middle East’s Expert Speaks on June 17, 2026.
By: Samriddhi Vij, Akram Zaoui, and Mahdi Ghuloom
In the early hours of June 15, U.S. President Donald Trump confirmed an announcement by Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif that a peace deal between the United States and Iran had been reached, iterating that both sides had declared “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.” Trump subsequently emphasized that his efforts had saved Israel from nuclear extinction and made the Middle East safer. The deal — structured initially as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) — focuses on the cessation of hostilities and the toll-free reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, with mine clearance scheduled to begin following formal signature. Sixty days of negotiations on sanctions and Iran’s nuclear program are expected to follow. A signing ceremony is scheduled for June 19 in Geneva, with Vice President JD Vance expected to attend.
ORF Middle East experts offer their quick takes below.
Four Fault Lines Behind the Peace Deal
The Trump administration’s interim peace deal with Tehran is best read as a fragile pause — and four fault lines explain why.
First, Israel was sidelined entirely. Netanyahu has conceded he does not even know the memorandum’s contents. Any durable agreement requires acceptance from the region’s most consequential military actor, yet Israelis across the political spectrum have denounced the deal — with opposition leader Yair Lapid demanding Netanyahu’s resignation. An aggrieved, excluded Israel is a structural spoiler.
Second, the framework declares an end to hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon — but Israel insists it retains freedom of action against Hezbollah. Israeli officials have signaled that strikes in Lebanon will continue beyond the Iran war. A cornerstone clause of the deal has has been undermined before its formal implementation.
Third, Washington and Tehran are already narrating divergent futures. Iran’s deputy foreign minister has conditioned negotiations on the prior release of frozen assets; a U.S. official flatly rejected this, stating that “no frozen funds will be released without the Iranians implementing their commitments.” These incompatible starting positions threaten to unravel the deal before substantive talks begin.
Fourth, and most gravely, the core nuclear questions are deferred. Iran retains roughly 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. Trump had previously vowed to seize or destroy it, but Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei has forbidden its export. This is the central issue the war was ostensibly fought over — and it remains entirely unresolved.
With the MOU text still unpublished and the parties’ positions remaining mutually exclusive, the act of signing may prove to be the easier step. The real challenge will lie in implementation.
Samriddhi Vij is an Associate Fellow for Geopolitics at ORF Middle East.
The Frozen‑Assets Gambit: Tehran’s Price for Peace
In the days following Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s declaration that unfreezing Iran’s overseas assets was a precondition for talks with Washington, the presence of Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati in the Iranian delegation in Islamabad signaled that the issue would be central to negotiations. The stakes are significant: Iran’s estimated US$100 billion in frozen assets would provide much-needed relief to an economy in freefall — the rial has lost 20,000% of its value against the dollar over four decades, and roughly 45% in 2025 alone. The conflict further deepened this monetary crisis. By mid-April, Iranian state television assessed wartime damage at US$270 billion — approximately 60% of GDP.
By late April, Ghalibaf and Hemmati had reportedly travelled to Qatar to negotiate the immediate release of US$12 billion, with a further US$12 billion to follow. In early June, senior regime figure Mohsen Rezaei publicly stated that the frozen assets question was blocking a breakthrough. Following the June 15 agreement, Iranian state media claimed the United States had accepted Tehran’s demand — which Vice President JD Vance flatly denied.
For Iran’s negotiators, such claims may serve to reassure hardliners by portraying Washington as having conceded ground. Yet they must also deliver tangible results. Ahead of the agreement, they may have secured assurances that some funds would be released early in the 60-day period allocated to finalizing a comprehensive deal.
Reports — denied by Trump himself — that Washington is considering a US$300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran suggest the United States is still devising how to deploy financial incentives to shape a settlement. Crucially, for Tehran, unfreezing assets constitutes both proof of American commitment and a symbolic blow to the regime-change option championed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Akram Zaoui is an Associate Fellow for Geopolitics at ORF Middle East.
A Peace Deal That Sidelines the Gulf
Between the lines of statements emerging from Gulf capitals, a consistent message to Washington is taking shape. Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE have each reminded their counterparts that any final deal must hold Iran to the principles of “good neighborliness.” Saudi Arabia formulated the same idea, calling for a lasting agreement that accounts for “the security interests of regional countries.” The concern is legitimate: reported snippets of the U.S.-Iran deal contain no commitment by Iran to refrain from aggressing on or interfering with Gulf neighbors — this after over 7,000 projectiles were fired by Iran and dozens of individuals were caught in Iranian proxy cells across the Gulf.
The contradictions from Washington are compounding Gulf frustration. U.S. officials now appear to expect Gulf states to contribute to a US$300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran — just days after Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent suggested it was the Gulf that could demand compensation from Iran through frozen assets. By disregarding the costs borne by the Gulf, Washington risks pushing these states toward direct deals with Iran to negotiate their own peace terms — a prospect a senior U.S. official has dismissed as “preposterous.” From Washington’s standpoint, the skepticism may be warranted: for a direct Gulf-Iran deal to move from preposterous to plausible, two things would need to happen simultaneously. First, a solidification of a unified Gulf front capable of securing favorable terms; and second, genuine goodwill from an Iran that is currently more assertive than at any point in recent memory.
Mahdi Ghuloom is a Junior Fellow for Geopolitics at ORF Middle East.