The Ankara Summit in July 2026 will be a major stress test for Europe’s security — and likely not the last. At this year’s edition of the annual NATO Summit, European leaders will keenly watch for signals from U.S. President Donald Trump about continued U.S. involvement in Europe’s defense. NATO — a 77-year-old alliance now consisting of 32 members — has been stressed over the past eighteen months by high U.S. tariffs on European countries; Trump’s desire to annex Greenland, a territory of Denmark; uncoordinated negotiations with Russia over a potential ceasefire in Ukraine; and the lack of support by many European countries for the U.S.-led war against Iran. Trump has not just demanded that Europe spend more on its own defense — a longstanding U.S. desire — but has threatened to draw down U.S. military assets in Europe in retaliation for perceived non-compliance. The result is a sharp realization on the part of many European leaders that they can no longer entrust the United States with continental security. Nevertheless, the path to a more autonomous European defense architecture is neither clear nor straight.
In large part, Europe’s security dilemma is a product of diffused responsibility for various military functions — plans, operations, command structures, recruitment, and defense industrial capabilities — between NATO, individual European member states, and the European Union (EU). Long-term defense plans, contingencies, and operations remain largely the responsibility of NATO, where the United States retains a leadership role (including by appointing the Supreme Allied Commander Europe or SACEUR) and is deeply integrated at an operational level. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty remains functionally the cornerstone of collective security and extends U.S. nuclear deterrence to all NATO member countries. However, military budgets, recruitment, training, procurement, and defense industrial capabilities remain the responsibilities of individual member states. Meanwhile, the EU is increasingly playing a role in security coordination and procurement through the creation of a new European Commissioner for Defense and Space and a €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) lending program to boost defense industrial production.
Europe’s security environment nevertheless continues to deteriorate. While not directly engaged in the war in Ukraine, many European countries — including the EU as a whole — have offered considerable financial and military assistance to Kyiv. Europe confronts regular drone overflights and frequent cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure. Wars in the Middle East and North Africa have contributed to large-scale migration from places like Syria and Libya. Resource competition is intensifying in the Mediterranean and the Arctic. Beyond disillusionment with Russia and the United States over Ukraine and Greenland, respectively, European leaders also increasingly perceive China as an adverse security challenge, both for its support for Russia’s war efforts in Ukraine and for its heightened presence and activities in Arctic and Atlantic security.
In private, European security leaders are under few illusions as to what is now required on their parts. An industrial rearmament is well underway in northern and eastern Europe. Many European countries are boosting their defense budgets, led by Germany’s Zeitenwende, with clear implications for defense industrial capabilities. The Nordic countries, Baltic states, Poland, and Czechia — motivated by threat perceptions vis-à-vis Russia — have invested heavily in increasing their defense production capabilities — in drones, munitions, and automated systems. Collectively, Europe is home to several industry leaders in the production of artillery, tanks, diesel-electric submarines, combat and transport aircraft, and other major platforms.
Yet there are clear gaps where Europe will struggle to fill a potential void left by the United States. These include intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, targeting information required for long-range strike capabilities, space-based military assets, and certain air and missile defense functions. Perhaps most irreplaceable is the United States’ extended nuclear deterrent; there are real questions about whether the United Kingdom can deter independently of the United States, and if France is willing and able to extend its nuclear deterrent to all of Europe. Moreover, on defense industrial production, France often prioritizes its national champions over collective European-wide efforts that can scale, effectively functioning as a rival rather than a collaborator to critical German-, British-, and Italian-led initiatives.
A bigger challenge for Europe is social uncertainty. Threat perceptions vary across the continent. Finland, Sweden, the Baltic states, and Poland remain concerned about imminent military confrontations with Russia. On the other hand, Spain, Portugal, and Italy naturally prioritize Mediterranean security and attendant concerns about resources, migration, and illicit trade. Many European publics have — despite the war in Ukraine — grown accustomed to the Long Peace that has characterized post-World War II Europe and are resistant to the social and economic costs associated with remilitarization. Military recruitment remains a struggle, exacerbated by adverse demographics, and employment by the armed forces is generally unattractive among youth populations. Politically, higher defense budgets remain hotly contested, with critics on the right and left in places like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom opposed to such measures. France, in particular, is heading into presidential elections with the very real prospect of an anti-establishment leader more inclined to resist or reverse defense spending and preparedness.
Europe’s rearmament is already well underway and reflected in defense spending and industrial efforts. But despite Europe’s push for more military self-sufficiency amid tensions with the United States, questions remain as to whether Europe’s political leadership, domestic politics, and social conditions can facilitate the development of true security and strategic autonomy. For the foreseeable future, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Poland, along with NATO’s Secretary General and European Commission leaders, will try to collectively coordinate a gradual Europeanization of NATO while steadily developing autonomous capabilities.
Dhruva Jaishankar is Executive Director at ORF America.