By: Ammar Nainar
On September 21, leaders from Australia, India, Japan and the United States convened in Delaware for the fourth Quad leaders’ summit. The Wilmington Declaration consolidated cooperation on technology, clean energy, disaster relief, space, maritime security, health, agriculture, and infrastructure, and expressed common perspectives on regional and multilateral issues. While positively received in India, the statement was criticized by some commentators in Australia and the United States for not mentioning China more explicitly.
But compared to previous editions, the latest Quad declaration reflected far stronger language on China’s aggression and intimidation of its neighboring countries in the South China Sea. Previous declarations had a perfunctory line on maintaining freedom of navigation in the “East and South China Seas.” The Wilmington Declaration specifically noted the Quad’s serious concerns about the “militarization of disputed features” and “coercive maneuvers” in the South China Sea. It emphasized adherence to international maritime law (UNCLOS) and for the first time — at the Quad leaders’ level — mentioned the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the South China Sea that went against China. The more specific language plainly conveys worsening threat perceptions amongst the Quad countries about Chinese aggression in the South China Sea.
It should be little surprise then that the Quad unveiled new initiatives on maritime security: the launch of a joint Coast Guards exercise (Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission); a dialogue focused on maritime law; a military logistics network to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations; and training (MAITRI) for partner countries to better utilize the Quad’s maritime domain awareness network (IP-MDA). In early October, India is also hosting the 28th edition of the Malabar Exercise in its east coast where the Quad navies will exercise together with combat capabilities and special forces. These initiatives further formalize the Quad’s maritime security cooperation along with other partners.
Other announcements at Wilmington clearly highlighted areas where the Quad seeks to compete with China in the Indo-Pacific region. These extend to clean energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, higher education, and emerging technologies. For example, the Quad’s STEM fellowships have extended to Southeast Asian countries. They are exploring the deployment of 5G networks to Tuvalu. The four countries are also mobilizing investment to support port infrastructure and have established a supply chains initiative to diversify production of solar panels, hydrogen electrolyzers, and batteries.
Therefore, with a relatively strongly worded joint statement, more formalized maritime security cooperation, and expanding areas of collaboration, the Quad is not abdicating responsibility against China as some skeptics allege. Rather, China’s military, diplomatic, and economic coercion provides the rationale for many of the Quad’s initiatives. In the coming months, the Quad will have to navigate leadership changes in Japan and the United States. At the same time, the Quad now has relatively more “buy-in” across bureaucracies, militaries, parliaments, private sectors, and civil societies in the four countries. It remains an important forum for exchanging strategic assessments and facilitating coordination, but its strategic thrust and rationale are evident.
Ammar Nainar is a Junior Fellow and Program Assistant at ORF America.