By: Dhruva Jaishankar and Ammar Nainar
The first 100 days of Donald Trump’s second presidential term have witnessed a dizzying array of developments concerning the United States’ engagement with the world. These have included unexpected choices for his Cabinet; drastic cuts to foreign assistance, institutions, and spending; speeches by Vice President J.D. Vance in Paris and Munich; the public castigation of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the White House; claims of varying seriousness concerning Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal; increased deportations of undocumented migrants; abrupt visa cancelations; direct negotiations with Russia and Iran; and dramatic announcements surrounding global tariffs and trade. As observers struggle to make sense of these developments, it is worth considering three parallel debates that are shaping these outcomes.
MAGA vs. Realists vs. Neocons
Strategic discussions under Trump 2.0 have reflected at least three broad schools of thought. Many associated with the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement desire a more strategically retrenched United States and a foreign policy that is often an extension of American culture wars. Closer cooperation with those aligned to MAGA’s political priorities — particularly in Europe and Latin America — explains the administration’s attempts at building stronger relations with Italy, Argentina, Hungary, and El Salvador. There is also a deep skepticism of U.S. foreign policy elites as ‘warmongers’: Vice President Vance has declared that the United States should not be “wasting American lives being the policeman of the world.” Some extend this view to China, with Michael Anton, the State Department’s policy planning director, previously writing that “there is no core American national interest that would compel us to go to war over Taiwan.”
A second strategic worldview sees the Indo-Pacific and Western Hemisphere as national security priorities where the United States must contest Chinese influence, while remaining skeptical of “free-riding” European allies and military overcommitment. These self-described “realists” are also in favor of investments in manufacturing, energy, defense, missile defense, and shipbuilding, and some believe that attempts can be made to “un-unite” Russia and China and deter Beijing from invading Taiwan. The use of force against Houthis in Yemen and repeated invocations of “peace through strength” broadly align with this worldview. As Trump’s former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien has written, “Trump thinks highly of his predecessor Andrew Jackson’s [realist] approach to foreign policy: be focused and forceful when compelled to action but wary of overreach.”
Finally, there remains a more traditional U.S. approach to national security that perceives clear and interrelated adversarial relationships with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This worldview — which critics deride as “neo-con” — argues for a high level of military preparedness and cooperation with U.S. allies and partners in three theaters: the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. Although somewhat marginalized, this view still finds resonance in parts of the national security leadership, civilian bureaucracy, and military. Most proponents see China as presenting the preeminent challenge to the United States. For example, as then U.S. Senator Marco Rubio clearly stated, “Communist China is the most powerful adversary the United States has faced”, in part because as one former National Security Council advisor concludes, Beijing’s Leninist ideology is “incompatible” with the United States.
Trade Hawks vs. China Hawks vs. Tech vs. Investors
What makes analysis particularly confusing is that a parallel set of economic debates is running almost independently of strategic considerations. Some of Trump’s advisors — influential in advancing the initial barrage of tariffs — are true trade hawks, who seek to use tariffs and other instruments to rebalance goods trade not just with adversaries but with allies and partners too. This has resulted in advocacy for an External Revenue Service and belief that tariffs can be used for effective reindustrialization, decoupling, negotiations, and revenue generation. A second economic impulse is focused on China, with proponents believing that Beijing is responsible for most of the United States’ economic and trade problems. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, for example, has vented that the “Chinese…are the worst offenders in the international trading system.” Some advisors also believe that the United States must distinguish between China, on the one hand, and the United States’ Asian allies and partners, on the other.
A third economic camp reflects the views of those in the tech community, including formal and informal influencers such as Elon Musk, Peter Thiel, and David Sacks. They often seek to maintain U.S. technological superiority, including over China, by prioritizing high-skilled immigration, deregulation, cryptocurrency, and critical minerals. At the same time, they remain more skeptical of tariffs and less concerned about economic interdependence with China than either the trade hawks or China hawks, but also seek to prioritize government spending cuts. This technological impulse is reflected in Trump’s desire to make the United States the “crypto capital of the planet” or Vance’s speech at the AI Summit in Paris warning against excessive regulation. A fourth perspective goes even further, finding resonance in the financial sector, and seeks to moderate geopolitical competition for economic reasons, including with China. This manifests itself in the temptation to have a ‘constructive dialogue’ or make a ‘deal’ with China.
Trump as Peacemaker and Dealmaker
Trump has occasionally been sympathetic to — and personally reflected — all of these strategic and economic perspectives, if to varying degrees and at different points of time. But somewhat independent of these policy debates on U.S. strategy and the economy are factors specific to Trump’s personality and worldview, his personal considerations, and his business interests. In his own words, he wants the chief legacy of his second term to be that of a peacemaker. This explains his initial attempts at outreach to Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff is often the primary intermediary for these interactions, particularly with Moscow and Tehran. Trump has also spoken about expanding the Abraham Accords and working on denuclearization with Russia and China: “One of the first meetings I want to have [is] with President Xi [of] China and with President Putin of Russia…to say, ‘let's cut our military budget in half.’…We're all spending a lot of money that we could be spending on other things.”
Trump himself recognizes his opportunity to present himself as the great global peacemaker: “through a stroke of luck…I’m going to be president during the [FIFA] World Cup and the [Los Angeles] Olympics and the 250th anniversary. So, that’s…three big events.” His outgoing National Security Advisor Mike Waltz has said that Trump “is going to end the war in Europe [and] the Middle East…[Then], you’re going to have the Nobel Peace Prize sitting next to the name of Donald J. Trump.”
Beyond his personal ambition and concerns about his legacy, Trump is also motivated by the possibility of a ‘deal.’ In Witkoff’s words, “If we can get peace throughout the [Middle East], can you imagine these countries [Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE], [and] Qatar working collaboratively together and creating that type of market? It could be…bigger than Europe?” Other personal considerations continue to play a role, from Trump’s particular fondness for Britain to his love of golf and his diverse business interests. All these factors will be important to keep in mind as observers attempt to make sense of the United States as an international actor over the next four years.
Dhruva Jaishankar is Executive Director at ORF America and Ammar Nainar is a Program Coordinator and Junior Fellow for the Foreign Policy & Security program at ORF America.