By: Andre Nicola
For decades, Colombia has been one of the United States’ most important regional partners in Latin America. In the early 2000s under President Alvaro Uribe, the two countries cooperated closely on counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism initiatives under Plan Colombia. Trade relations consolidated with a bilateral free trade agreement in 2006, and the United States remains Colombia’s largest trading partner. Security and stability, long a challenge, culminated in a peace agreement between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Colombian government under President Juan Manuel Santos, who won a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. But under President Gustavo Petro, Colombia has pursued a more independent course from the United States, emphasizing negotiations with armed groups, scaling back traditional counternarcotics strategies, and diversifying its international partnerships.
These developments will all hang in the balance as Colombia holds the first round of its presidential election at the end of this month amid rising political violence. The assassination of candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay last year points to something deeper than electoral violence; it reflects a state still unable to fully control the operations of armed groups and the expanding footprint of organized crime. At the same time, the election unfolds against a strained U.S.-Colombia relationship. Tensions under U.S. President Donald Trump over tariffs, migration, and security cooperation have increased. Colombia blocked U.S. deportation flights, prompting retaliatory measures including tariffs and visa restrictions. The dispute has partly de-escalated but has exposed growing friction and raised questions in Washington about Colombia’s long-term strategic alignment. This year’s election is not just a domestic political contest. It will shape whether Colombia remains a closely aligned U.S. partner or evolves into a more autonomous and less predictable actor in the region.
The outcome of the 2026 election will serve as a referendum on this shift. A victory by a candidate aligned with the incumbent Petro’s liberal agenda would likely result in continued efforts to engage with armed groups and maintain a more balanced approach to global partnerships, including with China. For Washington, this could mean a more transactional relationship, with reduced emphasis on traditional security cooperation and less policy alignment on counternarcotics. On the other hand, the election of a more conservative, security-focused president would restore closer alignment with Washington, particularly on combating drug trafficking and organized crime. However, a return to hardline security policies carries risks, including the potential for renewed cycles of violence if not paired with broader institutional and economic reforms.
The leading candidates reflect these divergent paths. A left-leaning successor to Petro, such as Iván Cepeda, would likely continue Colombia’s current trajectory, prioritizing social reforms and a more independent foreign policy, resulting in a less predictable and more transactional relationship with Washington. A hardline conservative candidate such as Abelardo de la Espriella would likely deepen security cooperation with the United States and adopt a more confrontational approach to crime with a potential cost to domestic stability. A center-right alternative, such as Paloma Valencia, could seek a middle ground, reinvigorating ties with Washington on both security and economic issues while avoiding a full return to past hardline approaches.
Several key U.S. foreign policy priorities hang in the balance. Migration remains a central concern; Colombia is both a source and transit country and continues to host millions of Venezuelan migrants. Effective coordination is essential to managing migration flows while addressing humanitarian needs. Security cooperation is also at stake. Diverging priorities could weaken decades of joint efforts against transnational criminal organizations, potentially allowing these networks to expand. At the same time, economic and strategic competition is becoming increasingly important. While the United States remains Colombia’s top trade partner, China has steadily expanded its economic presence, particularly in infrastructure, energy, and finance. The next Colombian administration’s approach to foreign investment and trade will play a key role in determining whether U.S. influence in the country, and the broader region, erodes, or adapts.
Regardless of the outcome, the United States will need to adjust to a Colombia that is no longer automatically aligned with its priorities. U.S. disengagement from Colombia, whether through neglect or overreach, creates more risk than a flawed partnership. A more flexible strategy by the United States that expands cooperation beyond security to prioritize economic development, institutional capacity-building, and climate resilience can help address the root causes of violence and will be more effective in promoting long-term stability than a narrow focus on counternarcotics. If Washington defaults to a security-first framework after May, it won't just strain the partnership, it will accelerate Colombia's turn toward partners more willing to engage it on its terms.
Andre Nicola is a Program Coordinator for Latin America at ORF America.