By: Hsiao-Chen Lin
This month’s visit to India by China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and State Councilor Wang Yi produced several notable outcomes: both sides reaffirmed commitments to maintain border peace and tranquility; agreed to reopen three traditional Himalayan trade passes; announced the resumption of direct flights and streamlined visas; pledged to deepen bilateral trade and investment facilitation; and revived cultural and pilgrimage exchanges. However, the visit was somewhat overshadowed by a rare public disagreement between Beijing and New Delhi about Taiwan.
In China’s readout of the talks, it asserted that India had agreed that Taiwan is a part of China. The claim was swiftly contradicted by India’s Ministry of External Affairs, which issued a statement clarifying that Beijing had raised the Taiwan issue, but that New Delhi’s position “remains unchanged.” The statement noted explicitly that India’s ties with Taiwan, like those of the wider international community, focus on economic, technological, and cultural domains, and that such exchanges will continue. Tellingly, it added that even China itself engages with Taiwan in these very fields.
The language was calm but unequivocal. It punctured Beijing’s attempt to reframe the “One China” line as if India had already subscribed to its expanded interpretation. China has often insisted on a rigid interpretation of a “One China Principle.” India last reaffirmed a One China policy in its 2008 joint communiqué with Beijing, but it has not repeated the phrase in any joint statement since 2009. From that point forward, New Delhi appears to have treated the omission of explicit “One China” language as a form of diplomatic leverage — maintaining continuity in practice, while holding back rhetorical endorsement to preserve bargaining space in its dealings with China. In the latest exchange, India made clear that while it has never abandoned substantive ties with Taiwan, it has equally refused to step into the regulatory framework that Beijing seeks to impose.
The history of India’s approach matters here. In 1949, India was among the first non-communist states to recognize the People’s Republic of China. For former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, this was not merely a diplomatic decision but an expression of anti-colonial solidarity and the spirit of Asian-African solidarity. As Nehru argued, “China is a member of the Asian family and must take its rightful place in the United Nations.” At that time, “One China” referred purely to the question of representation. Even after the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, New Delhi did not reverse its recognition. For Nehru, recognizing Beijing was a way to stabilize the balance among great powers while preserving India’s moral authority in Asia and Africa.
The story shifted with China’s economic rise. Under Deng Xiaoping, reforms opened China to foreign capital and technology, embedding economic leverage into the One China framework. Jiang Zemin’s leadership brought China into the World Trade Organization, fully integrating Chinese manufacturing into global supply chains. Hu Jintao pursued a decade of “taoguang yanghui” (hide and bide), consolidating industrial and financial power.
Under Xi Jinping, “Made in China 2025” and the Belt and Road Initiative were launched in tandem, extending China’s reach from infrastructure to global rule-setting. China’s ability to draw on Taiwan’s supply chain expertise, Japanese quality control, Korean economies of scale, European machinery and materials, and American design and markets transformed it into a formidable manufacturing hub. At the same time, by absorbing aerospace and defense technologies from the post-Soviet space, Beijing laid the foundations for BeiDou navigation, semiconductor production, 5G telecommunications networks, and artificial intelligence competition. This growing confidence allowed Beijing to turn the Taiwan issue into a litmus test: to access China’s market, governments and companies were compelled to adhere to Beijing’s version of One China — not just as a political stance but as a condition of entry. The qualitative leap came with “China Standards 2035.” Here, Beijing sought to move beyond market leverage to normative control: shifting One China from a diplomatic formula into a regulatory presumption, where “there is only one China” morphed into “only China can set the rules.”
Against this backdrop, Wang Yi’s assertive tone in New Delhi amounted to a gesture aimed at drawing India into Beijing’s expanded “One China” narrative. India’s response drew a visible red line. Although New Delhi has recognized Beijing as China's representative since 1949, that has never precluded economic, technological, and cultural ties with Taiwan, which have intensified in recent years. In 2024, Taiwan further elevated its outreach by opening a representative office in Mumbai, in addition to offices in Delhi and Chennai. Last year, the Taiwan-India CEO Roundtable and Industrial Collaboration Summit facilitated concrete cooperation in key areas, including 5G integration, drone operator training, and electronics recycling. Economically, Foxconn has become a symbol of this deepening engagement. Taiwan’s multi‑billion‑dollar commitment under India’s Semiconductor Mission is helping to anchor semiconductor investments, reinforcing complementarity in global supply chains.
This is also why Taiwan has gradually earned broader international recognition — not necessarily through formal diplomatic ties, but as a partner to major economies in fields like artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Governments increasingly recognize that tacitly endorsing Beijing’s One China interpretation means accepting the spillover of Chinese rules. Market access becomes politicized, technical standards are subsumed into political language, and the world’s regulatory diversity is steadily eroded. By contrast, Taiwan demonstrates a different path. With its semiconductor leadership, an open economy, and pluralistic partnerships, it shows that the international community can uphold their One China policies while refusing to validate Beijing’s expansionist interpretation. Taiwan proves that participation in supply chains and the defense of regulatory diversity need not occur within a framework dictated by China.
The latest attempt by China to dictate terms of engagement with Taiwan, and India’s response, help to crystallize the transformation of the One China narrative. During the Cold War, it was a matter of representation. In the era of globalization, it became a market test. Today, it has escalated into a contest over rules. To acknowledge Beijing as representing China is one thing; to acquiesce to China representing the rules of the world is another.
Hsiao-Chen Lin is an Assistant Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University (Taiwan). She is currently a Visiting Fellow at ORF America in Washington DC. The views expressed here are solely her own.