By: Natalie Boyse and Ammar Nainar
Just a day after the inauguration of U.S. President Donald Trump, the foreign ministers of the Quad – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – met in Washington, DC. The meeting signals a continued commitment to the grouping, which was elevated to a foreign minister-level dialogue during the first Trump Administration. Under the Biden Administration, the Quad established working groups on issues such as energy, health, maritime management, infrastructure, and critical and emerging technologies. As officials plan new initiatives and prepare for the Quad Leaders’ Summit in India later this year, one area to explore further collaboration might involve Quad scenario planning exercises on Indo-Pacific security issues. Such an exercise could involve officials from the policy planning staff of each foreign ministry, the net assessment offices from each defense ministry, and the strategy directorates within the National Security Council’s or Prime Minister’s offices of all four Quad countries.
A scenario planning exercise allows officials to brainstorm possible futures that might impact a country or a group of countries’ strategic position. Compared to tabletop exercises — where officials respond to given scenarios and work as a team to solve issues — a scenario planning exercise is more deliberative and, in turn, will expose officials to different perspectives on the same issue. This is useful for understanding assumptions, objectives, sensitivities, constraints, and historical context behind policy choices. In the long run, scenario planning would help officials within Quad countries avoid misunderstandings if crises erupt in areas such as the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, or the Indian Ocean region.
At ORF America, we have had some experience with scenario planning for the Quad. Last October, ORF America and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute DC convened a task force of 12 emerging China experts – three each from Australia, Japan, India, and the United States – to examine China’s strategic futures by 2030. While China looms large for all four countries, their China experts do not necessarily share experiences and lessons learned, let alone collaborate. The goal of our FourSight task force was to promote academic and professional cooperation among these 12 emerging China scholars.
Our scenario planning exercise occurred in several stages. First, the task force identified more than 125 factors that might determine China’s strategic outlook in 2030. They eventually selected two primary variables based on the degree of importance and uncertainty that might significantly impact China’s strategic outlook in 2030. Next, they identified four scenarios based on these two variables and constructed narratives that outlined and characterized each scenario. The group concluded that two drivers will primarily shape China’s outlook: first, Beijing’s confidence in its own economic resilience and its perception of the cohesion of the countervailing coalition involving the United States, its allies, and partners. Despite their diverse backgrounds, the task force agreed that Beijing’s perceptions, its sense of economic resilience, and cooperation among members of a balancing coalition will be the key determinants of China’s strategic outlook.
Scenario planning exercises such as FourSight can aid strategic planning efforts by surfacing important strategic questions and galvanizing future policy action. Officials can jointly assess various alternative scenarios, evaluate existing policies, and identify contingencies that may require future attention. For example, while discussing China’s future scenarios, our task force considered questions on whether “Peak China” is a possibility, the direction of China’s nuclear modernization, to what degree China is courting the Global South, and the success of its outreach and messaging.
Regular scenario planning exercises among the Quad countries would enhance their budding security cooperation. When combined with military exercises, intelligence exchanges, and maritime security dialogues, scenario planning would enable the sharing of strategic assessments, as well as stronger networks between officials in the security establishment. Some potential topics for an official Quad scenario planning exercise could be Chinese aggression in the South China Sea; succession crises involving the Dalai Lama; China’s attempts to change the status quo in Taiwan; and growing Chinese naval activities in the Indian Ocean. Such exercises would help ensure that the Quad is better integrated to meet security challenges when required.
Natalie Boyse is Senior Program Manager for Global Programs and Ammar Nainar is a Program Coordinator and Junior Fellow at ORF America.