By: Aleksei Zakharov
The following excerpt is from Chapter 5 — Russia-China Defence and Security Partnership: Intensification Amid Constraints of ORF Global Quarterly: Disruption and Recalibration.
“Never against each other, but not always together” —this is the formulaic expression often used in discussions among Russian officials and experts to describe Russia-China relations. Such characterisation captures the nuances of bilateral engagement more accurately than the widely publicised “no-limits partnership”, which has become a cliché in global expert analysis since February 2022.
Despite the formal projection of a “comprehensive strategic partnership”, neither side is willing to shoulder the burden of protecting the other during conflicts. China is carefully balancing its position on the war in Ukraine, offering Russia targeted support while avoiding direct military involvement in the form of supplying lethal weapons or deploying troops. Similarly, Moscow would like to avoid getting entangled in China’s conflicting relations with India, Japan, Vietnam, or the United States (US). This cautious approach on both sides imposes a clear ceiling on their engagement and leaves limited prospects for an alliance-like partnership in the future.
Over the past several years, Russia and China have strengthened their political dialogue, reinforcing their affinity in defence and security. Much of this strategic alignment derives from both Moscow’s and Beijing’s efforts to act in concert to counterbalance the US. Their shared opposition to US hegemony has accelerated the evolution of their bilateral ties, most evident in defence cooperation. At an unprecedented level of bilateral engagement, defence relations have expanded to encompass extensive transfers of technology from Russia, the intensification and broadening of bilateral exercises, and closer coordination between the militaries, including the exchange of battlefield experience.
In the military-technical domain, Russia has long supplied China with advanced weaponry and equipment, ranging from fighter jets and jet engines to air defence systems and assistance in developing a ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS). The latter is particularly noteworthy from a political perspective: first, because such systems represent rare and sophisticated technology previously developed and maintained only by the US and Russia; and second, because it directly enhances China’s strategic capabilities vis-à-vis the US. Whether the Russian and Chinese systems exchange data automatically—a development that would effectively amount to the creation of a joint global missile defence network and reveal the depth of their military cooperation— remains an open question.
The Russia-China partnership has been described in increasingly expansive terms since the war in Ukraine began, but the reality is more constrained than the rhetoric suggests. Learn more about the real depth of this partnership and the limits both Moscow and Beijing continue to observe in ORF Global Quarterly: Disruption and Recalibration.