NATO's Indo-Pacific Tilt Widens Dialogue with India

By Dhruva Jaishankar and Ammar Nainar

The following article originally appeared in The Hindustan Times on July 10, 2023 under the headline “NATO Can Help Delhi Anchor Indo-Pacific.”

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will hold its annual summit in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius on July 11-12. A mutual defence alliance of North American and European countries since 1949, NATO was until recently perceived by many as a relic of the Cold War. (French President Emmanuel Macron famously declared its brain death in a 2019 interview.) But Russia’s war in Ukraine has injected the alliance with fresh purpose. In the last year, Finland has been included and Sweden is expected to join, subject to ratification by all members, swelling NATO’s membership to 32 countries.

In addition, NATO has official partnerships with 39 countries, of which three (Russia, Belarus, and Afghanistan) are currently suspended. These partnerships – including with countries as diverse as Mongolia and Pakistan – encompass different degrees of formality and involvement, from parliamentary engagement to technical cooperation. Some NATO partners – Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand – have been more closely aligned in coordinating against Russia, and are expected to participate in the Vilnius Summit.

Beyond the refocus on Russia and expanded membership, NATO’s 2022 strategic concept gives some prominence to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), declaring that Beijing’s “stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” The document also pledges to “address the systemic challenges posed by PRC to Euro-Atlantic security.”

The inclusion of China among NATO’s concerns offers greater scope for conversations with India. Reports that NATO may consider opening an office in Japan to engage with Indo-Pacific countries suggest that its strategic priorities are coming to terms with shifting global realities.

India has traditionally been wary about engagement with NATO. This reticence is somewhat understandable, given the alliance’s historical mission and its focus on Russia, a close military partner of India’s. Yet, despite these apparent reservations, India has had a surprising degree of formal interaction with NATO over the past two decades.

The earliest engagements between India and NATO were driven by questions of arms control and counterterrorism, with their first official dialogue held in 2005. In the subsequent two years, Pranab Mukherjee met with NATO’s secretary general in 2006 and 2007, as both defence and external affairs minister; NATO’s deputy secretary general visited India in 2007. In 2019, a NATO-India political dialogue covered issues such as China, terrorism, and Pakistan. Two years later, NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg addressed the Raisina Dialogue.

Practical cooperation between India and NATO was most apparent on the shared challenge of Indian Ocean piracy. Between 2009 and 2011, Indian and NATO officials were involved in coordinating counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, including in meetings hosted by China’s ministry of defence in Beijing and by NATO in Brussels. The Indian Navy also established contacts with the NATO rapid deployable corps in Valencia. These steps produced some concrete results. For example, in May 2011, the Indian Navy coordinated with NATO patrolling vessels to thwart an attack by pirates in the Arabian Sea. Two years later, NATO naval assets helped rescue 14 Indian sailors in the Gulf of Aden.

Periodic official engagement between NATO and India also concerned Afghanistan, military education, peacekeeping operations, and cybersecurity, among other areas. Prior to the U.S. withdrawal from Kabul, Indian officials shared perspectives with NATO officials and military commanders involved in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) there.

In 2007, India’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) cooperated with Finland and NATO following a significant series of cyber-attacks on Estonia. Indian officials were invited as observers to NATO exercises in the North Sea in 2008. More recently, a delegation from India’s National Defence College, led by the commandant, visited NATO’s Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre.

Afghanistan may now have receded from view in Brussels, even though it remains a high priority for New Delhi. Nevertheless, the contours of their overlapping agendas are more readily apparent today. These include maritime security, cybersecurity, political developments in the Indo-Pacific, professional military education, climate change, and possibly arms control and nuclear escalatory dynamics. Obviously, India and NATO will continue to have very different approaches to engaging with Russia, including different stakes and interests, and often divergent geopolitical priorities and calculations.

An important consideration is that NATO not only engages several close partners of Russia, such as Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Serbia, but that until recently it enjoyed more extensive contacts with Beijing and Moscow than it did with New Delhi. Officers from China’s People's Liberation Army (PLA) have taken part in NATO education and training activities. Until November 2021, NATO even had an office in Moscow. Despite – and perhaps because of – their different vantage points, NATO’s acknowledgement of growing strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific opens the door for broader and deeper dialogue with India.

Dhruva Jaishankar is Executive Director and Ammar Nainar is Junior Fellow at ORF America. The views expressed are personal

Report Card: A Status Update on India-U.S. Relations

by Dhruva Jaishankar

The following article originally appeared in The Print on June 13, 2023.

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi prepares for what is only the third state visit by an Indian leader to the United States, where do India-US relations stand today? For more than two decades, commentators in both countries have been prone to writing off relations as difficult and underwhelming, characterised more by mistrust than opportunity. Stories about differences – whether on Pakistan or Ukraine, trade or domestic politics – tend to predominate news coverage in both countries. Yet, despite some important divergences, this is a relationship in which leaders as diverse as Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, and Modi on the Indian side, and Bill Clinton, George W Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden in Washington have deepened their collective investment. Indeed, given the breadth of issues and structures, India-US relations are arguably better than they have ever been, to the point where even trenchant differences are now discussed with considerable candour between officials from both sides.

The singular change over the past decade or so is that the relationship now has both structure and multiple touchpoints. Strategic dialogues involving the United States and India include the Quad (along with Japan and Australia), I2U2 (along with Israel and the United Arab Emirates), the 2+2 Dialogue involving defence and foreign ministers, the Defence Policy Group (DPG), and a National Security Advisor (NSA)-led initiative on critical and emerging technologies (iCET). The two countries also have a Trade Policy Forum, a Commercial Dialogue, an Economic and Financial Partnership, a Strategic Trade Dialogue, and a CEO Forum. The agenda has further widened with cabinet-level discussions that include the Strategic Clean Energy Partnership and Higher Education Dialogue, and India is also involved in three of the four pillars of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). But it is worth taking stock of what all these discussions have accomplished – or are attempting to achieve – as well as areas of continuing divergence.

Grade A: Good relations, getting better

Quad, I2U2, military exchanges, maritime cooperation, bilateral trade, energy flows, Indian students, and the Indian-American community

Perhaps the most dramatic convergence in recent years has been on strategic issues. The idea that India and the United States could work closely with third partners and in third regions had been talked about for years. But it is now a reality. The major vehicle in the Indo-Pacific is the Quad, which is working on discrete outcomes on critical and emerging technologies, maritime domain awareness, infrastructure, health, cybersecurity, space, and clean energy. The Quad countries, including Japan and Australia, also continue to exchange perspectives on strategic developments and work together in various formats for security cooperation. Coordination on China and the Indo-Pacific between the governments is now broad and regular. The more nascent I2U2, involving Israel, the UAE, India, and the US, encompasses specific projects on food security and clean energy.

When it comes to bilateral security, military-to-military engagements — including staff talks, exchanges, and military exercises — have increased the ability of the two militaries to operate together, building habits of cooperation. Enabling agreements to facilitate logistics and secure communications have been signed, along with some other basic protocols. Maritime cooperation has been particularly promising, including a new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IP-MDA) initiative that involves the region-wide sharing of satellite-based radio frequency data to better secure the seas.

Additionally, the volume of bilateral goods and services trade between India and the United States has grown considerably, creating jobs in both countries. Of particular significance, US energy exports to India – including both oil and gas – have risen significantly from being negligible just two decades ago. The United States remains a preferred foreign destination among Indians for higher education, with Indians comprising the second-largest number of foreign students in the United States. The Indian-American community continues to serve as a successful bridge between the two countries, increasing interest in India about the United States and improving US research, cultural, and business contacts with India.

Grade B: Gradually improving ties

West Asia, Africa, the UN and multilateral organisations, defence co-production, clean energy, technology, and business relations

Strategically, India and the United States are improving coordination in a number of geographies and institutions, albeit from a lower base. These include West Asia (the Middle East) and Africa. While voting patterns at the United Nations remain distinct and unaligned, there is now greater dialogue and cooperation on institutional membership and counter-terrorism. Coordination is improving in many multilateral organisations, including new institutions and those where one or the other party is not a member (such as the Paris Club). The credit and aid agencies of the two countries are also converging, exploring specific projects in third countries. In terms of security, US defence sales and supplies to India have grown, and co-production has increased, with most large defence companies now sourcing products or services from Indian suppliers.

Clean energy and associated technologies represent a promising area of collaboration. US companies are investing in India’s ambitious renewable energy sector, although not yet at ideal volumes. There is also considerable interest in India’s green hydrogen mission, with US firms already producing electrolysers in India. Coordination on critical minerals – especially lithium, graphite, and cobalt – is already underway, and the two countries are coordinating in providing climate information services.

Beyond clean energy, the broader technology partnership is also moving in a positive direction. This includes coordination on 5G telecommunications, nascent cooperation in identifying vulnerabilities in semiconductor supply chains, promising advancements in space technologies, developing networks among investors, and cooperation on supply chains, counter-terrorism financing, and tax evasion. Differences over data governance have been largely addressed by the inclusion of the notion of trusted geographies in India’s pending digital legislation and regulations. In many of these areas, the policy regimes are increasingly aligned, with the expectation that practical cooperation will follow. Finally, while business ties remain strong, with a large Indian and American corporate presence in each other’s countries, there are still plenty of unexplored possibilities.

Grade C: Stagnant or underwhelming cooperation

Afghanistan, Myanmar, Iran, defence R&D, biotech, visas, and US students to India

There are several areas where India-US relations remain stuck or misaligned. In the strategic sphere, these include Afghanistan, where India was excluded from the Doha Process despite having converging objectives. India has now opened up direct channels with the Taliban. On Myanmar, both India and the United States have called for a return to democracy but have pursued different means and levels of engagement with the military leadership due to geographic and strategic disparities. Iran also presents some dissonance, partly complicated by US negotiations around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) for Iran’s nuclear programme.

One defence and security, joint defence research and development (R&D) has lagged behind other aspects of the relationship. The Defence Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) was the earlier mechanism for enabling this. But it has proved limiting as there were few cutting-edge defence technologies where India and the US had shared needs and complementary capabilities. Instead, new efforts, including those accelerated under iCET, are being explored to improve defence industrial cooperation. One such development is the establishment of a defence innovation bridge called INDUS-X, which will incorporate the private sector and start-ups.

While technological collaboration has generally deepened, certain sectors, such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals, have faced difficulties due to questions of intellectual property. Issues such as cost and accessibility mean the healthcare systems of the United States and India are often misaligned. People-to-people links have been inhibited by an archaic US visa regime and processing challenges exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. This has prevented Indian tourists, businesspeople, and students from travelling to the United States in recent years, although the US government is now making a considerable effort to rectify the situation. While Indian student numbers remain strong, and interest is high, there are still too few US students going to India to study. This reflects both on Indian higher education and infrastructure. Consequently, there is insufficient awareness or knowledge of opportunities in India among Americans, particularly those outside of government and certain business sectors.

Grade D: Major differences

Russia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, democracy, and multilateral trade negotiations.

Strategic differences persist between Washington and New Delhi when it comes to Russia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, although these are now openly discussed in bilateral forums. India still sees the need for engagement with Russia in areas such as conventional defence, energy, food security, critical technologies like nuclear energy and space, as well as larger strategic priorities in Eurasia. The United States, on the other hand, has longstanding relations with various stakeholders in Pakistan, despite the ongoing political and economic turmoil there. This occasionally results in US attempts at resurrecting engagement and assistance to Pakistan, although the levels of trust and importance have diminished. Regarding Bangladesh, the United States has underscored a different set of issues compared to India, which instead focuses on consolidating economic, trade, and connectivity links with the incumbent government.

Other differences arise in the context of democracy, where divergent conceptions and priorities are apparent, despite India’s participation in the US-led Global Summit for Democracy and the two countries’ collaboration to strengthen democratic institutions in third countries and regions. These differences are most evident in the regular religious freedom reporting by the executive branch of the US government, but are also raised in the US Congress—mostly on the left but occasionally among the religious right—as well as in the American media. The Indian government, meanwhile, dismisses such statements as unnecessary interference and has occasionally pointed out the imperfections of American democracy. Finally, sharp differences continue to play out in multilateral trade negotiations, which often adopt a more adversarial tone compared to bilateral commercial discussions.

Conclusion

Overall, the cooperative aspects of the India-US relationship now easily outweigh the areas of fundamental difference. US officials have a considerable appreciation for the diverse ways in which the partnership with India benefits the United States, even if that sentiment has not always permeated through the strategic community, media, or general public. Similarly, sharper disagreements with China on security, regional politics, economy, and technology have prompted India to invest more in its relationship with the United States. Indeed, New Delhi has often reached out to the United States during times when global sentiments towards US power or policy were ambivalent, such as after the invasion of Iraq or Donald Trump’s election. That India will continue to approach the world from its independent standpoint is well appreciated; in a world where power is increasingly diffused, few US leaders are under any illusions about achieving wholescale policy convergence with New Delhi. The real question is how much the two countries can maximise the benefits of their numerous overlapping interests, particularly given the uncertainties of election cycles and domestic politics in the years ahead.