By: Andre Nicola
Brazil’s presidential election is arguably the most consequential election in Latin America this year. With roughly 159 million eligible voters, Brazil is the region’s largest economy, a large market and trading nation, and home to the majority of the Amazon rainforest. Global competition over critical minerals, energy, technology, and supply chains is increasing the strategic importance of Brazil. It also has one of the few remaining left-leaning governments in South America, following recent rightward shifts in Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.
The presidential race has narrowed to a two-way contest between incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party and Senator Flávio Bolsonaro of the Liberal Party, son of the imprisoned former president Jair Bolsonaro. With the first round set for October 4, the two are separated by a narrow margin, and recent corruption allegations against both campaigns have made the race even harder to call. It is unlikely that either candidate will win a majority on October 4, so the two frontrunners will head to a runoff on October 25. The outcome of the election will have massive implications for Brazil’s domestic policies and will also shape how Brazil engages with partners in Washington, Beijing, and the rest of the world.
The two leading candidates offer sharply different orientations. President Lula has anchored his policies in multilateralism, deeper engagement with BRICS and the Global South, and continued economic ties with China. A Lula victory would likely extend these policies alongside strong environmental commitments and expanded social programs. Flavio Bolsonaro, the leading opposition candidate, would likely pivot towards Washington and traditional Western partners, including reconsidering Brazil’s role in BRICS. A Bolsonaro government would likely align closely with the Trump administration and be more open to cooperation on several strategic priorities. These differences could have meaningful consequences for U.S. policy, particularly as Washington seeks to strengthen its position in the Western Hemisphere and reduce growing Chinese influence in the region. The election comes amid heightened tensions between Brasília and Washington over trade, sovereignty, and the U.S. role in Brazilian affairs. In July, the Brazilian government accused the Trump administration in the United States of attempting to interfere in the election, leading to the revocation of visas for two U.S. government officials. That episode, together with U.S. tariffs on Brazilian goods, has strained relations ahead of the vote.
While the United States remains an important economic and diplomatic partner, China has become Brazil's largest trading partner, with total bilateral trade reaching a record $171 billion in 2025, more than double the roughly $83 billion Brazil traded with the United States during the same period. Brazil’s role in BRICS and its outreach to the Global South also reflect its ambition to exercise greater autonomy and influence in the international system. U.S.-Brazil relations have sharply deteriorated over trade in 2026. In July, the Trump administration imposed a 25% tariff on certain Brazilian goods following a U.S. Trade Representative Section 301 investigation into Brazilian policies, affecting areas including digital trade, tariffs, intellectual property, and deforestation. The dispute has become a central backdrop to the election, giving Lula a sovereignty message to run on. His opponents, meanwhile, have argued that confrontation with the United States has been costly. Negotiations between the two governments are ongoing though Brazil has refrained from imposing retaliatory measures. Whoever wins this election will inherit a strained relationship with Washington but also has opportunities for valuable partnerships in critical minerals, energy, and security.
Brazil holds vast mineral resources central to advanced technologies and energy infrastructure, including the world's second-largest rare earth reserves. In September, Brazil’s Senate passed a landmark critical minerals bill that established a national policy for strategic resources such as rare earths, nickel, and lithium, and gave the government greater oversight of mining deals and foreign investment. Washington, which is seeking to diversify its supply chains for these resources has already identified this as an area of greater cooperation. The next government could therefore play an important role in determining whether these resources become an area of deeper U.S.-Brazil economic cooperation or another area of competition.
Energy offers a second opening. Brazil combines substantial oil and gas production with vast renewable energy potential. The war in Iran has raised its profile as a supplier outside the Gulf. Brazilian crude production reached a record 4.5 million barrels per day in June, driven largely by Chinese demand. Brazil’s stewardship of the Amazon also makes it central to both U.S. energy and climate policy. Cooperation will require navigating Brazil's longstanding sensitivity to foreign involvement in the Amazon. Finally, shared security threats from organized crime, drug trafficking, illicit finance, and arms trafficking create room for closer security cooperation.
The United States has strong reasons to deepen cooperation with Brazil, but doing so will require recognizing that China remains Brazil’s largest trading partner. Even a government more sympathetic to Washington could face limits in how far it will distance itself from Beijing. Resolving the tariff dispute between Washington and Brasília will be the first test of whether Brazil’s next government can reset the relationship with the United States.
Andre Nicola is a Program Coordinator for Latin America at ORF America.