By: Piyush Verma and Medha Prasanna
Following the midterms in the United States, Democrats will now control both chambers of Congress from January 2027. In some sense, they have gained leverage without gaining control. Democrats will now chair relevant committees, set the agenda, and hold the power of the purse, but will still confront the prospect of a presidential veto. This has important implications for U.S. energy policy. President Donald Trump retains wide authority over sanctions, liquefied natural gas (LNG) approvals and federal leasing, and his tariffs, moved under Section 301 after the Supreme Court struck down the emergency tariffs in February, no longer depend on Congress. The October waiver of the Graham Act's tariffs on the largest buyers of Russian oil and gas shows how this works in practice: a law passed with bipartisan support was set aside by executive order, and tariffs can return whenever the administration chooses.
For U.S. partners, the question is which energy commitments made with Washington will hold. For energy importing economies, developments concerning the war with Iran will matter more than the balance of power on Capitol Hill. Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is close to a standstill, averaging three to four transits a day in the first week of November, against a pre-crisis norm of 85 a day. The closure strands LNG from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which the International Energy Agency estimates supply almost a fifth of global LNG exports and around 27% of Asia's LNG imports. Whether or not Democrats can press for a settlement on Iran, the war has already redrawn the map, making American LNG the balancing supply for Europe and Asia.
That shift raises the stakes of Europe's commitments, where the gap between direction and instruments is clearest. The EU's stated intention to buy $750 billion of U.S. energy by 2028 is a political framework, not a purchase contract. As the European Commission itself acknowledges, Brussels cannot compel its member states and companies to buy. The demand beneath it is real, with the United States supplying 58% of EU LNG in 2025. A Democratic Congress may bring more predictability to unresolved trade disputes that condition these large purchases, but the tariff lever stays with the White House. Europe's durable gains lie in long-term LNG and nuclear fuel contracts, where commercial logic and security policy already align.
In Asia, change will show first in the investment pledges. Under last year's trade agreements, Japan and South Korea promised $550 billion and $350 billion in U.S. investment respectively. Seoul says no final investment decision has been made on Alaska LNG, a project of up to $54.5 billion with only non-binding offtake agreements and no exports before 2031. Closer congressional scrutiny buys Seoul and Tokyo time to weigh such projects, though a White House keen to show results can still reach for tariffs. In either case, the projects most likely to survive are those that pass a commercial test. That favors the LNG Asian buyers need after Hormuz, as well as nuclear construction, backed by the cross-party coalition that passed the ADVANCE Act to boost nuclear energy 88 to 2 in the Senate in 2024.
Critical minerals by contrast, will draw the closest oversight. The administration has announced some 160 minerals deals worth almost $40 billion, many on executive authority, some through equity stakes in private companies. More than 50 House Democrats have questioned the transparency of agreements with foreign governments, singling out deals with the Democratic Republic of Congo and Kazakhstan. Framework partners such as Australia, which pledged to put at least $1 billion towards an $8.5 billion project pipeline of joint minerals projects, may therefore face document requests, if not subpoenas. Partners need not, however, expect the objective itself to change: in June, the House passed the bipartisan DOMINANCE Act, which directs cooperation with allies on mineral supply chains. The exposure lies in deals resting on presidential discretion rather than statute.
The same limits should temper expectations among clean-technology investors. Industry advocates see a path to restoring wind and solar credits curtailed by the 2025 tax law, and some credits have Republican support. But any reversal needs the president's signature. Korean and Japanese battery makers with U.S. plants should plan around the rules limiting Chinese content, which the 2025 law extended to six more credits, rather than around subsidies. Permitting reform, which LNG terminals, pipelines, and transmission lines need, may offer firmer ground. On November 9, the Senate voted 73-25 to advance a bipartisan bill that would bar future administrations from revoking permits already granted. That protection matters. The same day, President Trump said he still would not approve wind turbines.
AI partnerships face a parallel adjustment, driven less by Congress than by states and voters. Voters backed 33 of 34 local ballot measures restricting data centers, and Democrats won a majority on Georgia's utility regulator for the first time in 31 years on promises to lower bills. Because states, not Washington, regulate retail power, developers will increasingly carry the cost of new load. That may draw some computing capacity toward partners with spare power and faster grid connections, India among them, even as the AI industry itself will stay anchored in America.
These shifts point to a practical lesson to treat Washington as a system rather than a single office. That means building ties with incoming committee chairs and anchoring commitments in legislation and in contracts that make commercial sense without tariff pressure. The next few months offer early chances to begin. Trump’s Asia trip this month and the G20 summit in Florida in December will bring partners face-to-face with the president. But whatever they agree at these meetings will last longer if built to withstand congressional scrutiny. Canada and Mexico have particular reasons to work this way. Washington declined in July to renew the USMCA trade agreement in its current form, and Congress may have a role in approving any revised agreement. The United States’ strategic direction on energy security will hold even as its policies shift. Partners should plan for the gap between the two.
Piyush Verma is a Senior Fellow for the Energy & Climate program at ORF America and Medha Prasanna is a Program Coordinator and Junior Fellow for the Energy & Climate program at ORF America.